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LIES, LINE DRAWING, AND (DEEP) FAKE NEWS 
MARC JONATHAN BLITZ
*
 
You’ve been bitten by someone’s false beliefs. Thought contagion. 
—Muse, Thought Contagion (Warner Music single 2018) 
Don’t trust a stranger’s words . . . 
And they hypnotized all of us. Nobody knew who they could 
really trust. 
And they stretched us out until we split. Divided us up until there 
just was nothing left. 
—Chad VanGaalen, Host Body, 
on LIGHT INFORMATION (Sub Pop Records 2017) 
I. Introduction 
Before the computer-generated virtual reality of the 1999 movie The 
Matrix, there was The Cosmic Puppets—a 1957 book by Philip K. Dick in 
which a man, after many years living elsewhere, drives back to his hometown 
and discovers it is not merely the town that has changed, but its entire 
history.
1
 The house he lived in and streets he walked upon growing up have 
not merely been torn down and paved over—they’ve now never existed.2 The 
protagonist discovers that he remains a part of the town’s history: an old 
newspaper he obtains from the archives refers to his nine-year-old self in an 
obituary describing his death from scarlet fever.
3
 Instead of leaving the town 
at age nine, he has, in the town’s new strange and unfamiliar reality, been 
dead since that time.
4
 He finally meets one other person in the town who 
remembers it the way he does and has also been trying to understand why the 
town’s appearance and history has been covered with a false surface.5 With 
extraordinary mental effort, some homemade electrical technology, and 
stubborn refusal to accept the views of their fellow town members, they are 
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 1. PHILIP K. DICK, THE COSMIC PUPPETS (First Mariner Books 2012) (1957). 
 2. Id. at 1–6. 
 3. Id. at 12. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. at 54–55. 
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able to slowly strip away the veneer of fake reality that has been laid over 
their world and see once again the real town hidden underneath.
6
 
Dick’s story is just one example of what is sometimes called “paranoid 
science fiction,” a genre of science fiction where, as one encyclopedia of 
science fiction and fantasy describes it, “protagonists are plagued with vague 
intuitions of the stage-managed falsity of their perceptual experience or 
delusory nature of their very identities.”7 One finds numerous other examples 
of paranoid science fiction in Dick’s own writing, including other stories 
where one’s environment turns out to be a carefully constructed simulation 
and stories (like the basis for the movie Blade Runner) where the people one 
knows might be androids virtually indistinguishable from real human beings.
8
 
Other works of science fiction and fantasy also fit the genre: stories (and 
movies) such as The Thing and Invasion of the Body Snatchers, where people 
are replaced by alien look-a-likes;
9
 Twilight Zone episodes where a man finds 
his life is a screenplay in which he is a television actor;
10
 and The Matrix 
itself, where the day-to-day life the protagonists have grown up believing in 
is revealed to take place in a virtual reality simulation.
11
 Indeed, some 
examples of such paranoid science fiction are much older. One arguably finds 
something like it in the philosopher Rene Descartes’ 1641 thought 
experiment, wherein he imagines an omnipotent evil demon who can make 
him see, hear, and feel an external reality—“the sky, the air, the earth, 
colours, shapes, sounds and all external things”—of a kind that doesn’t really 
exist.
12
 
As the name indicates, paranoid science fiction is only fiction. In all of the 
stories just referenced, the “stage-managed falsity” of “perceptual 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Id. at 131–36. 
 7. Gary Westphal, Paranoia, in 2 THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE FICTION 
AND FANTASY 585 (Greenwood Press 2005). 
 8. See Blade Runner, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt00 
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 9. See The Thing, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, https://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0084787/plotsummary (last visited July 5, 2018); Invasion of the Body Snatchers, 
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experience” is the product of a mythical, supernatural entity or forms of alien 
or artificial intelligence imagined by the author. In other tales less removed 
from historical experience, the falseness of our historical world is the product 
not of an omnipotent demon or computer matrix, but rather of a control-
hungry authoritarian system, like the Ministry of Truth used in Orwell’s 1984 
to create “day-to-day falsification of the past” to ensure that people’s beliefs 
about reality serve the government’s interest.13  
But soon, at least a modest power of reality distortion may belong not 
solely to evil demons, digital overlords, or ministries of propaganda, but 
rather to any individual with widely available computer software: new 
technologies for altering video and audio material will likely allow 
individuals to create convincingly realistic footage of events that never 
occurred. Indeed, “forensic specialists predict that computers will be able to 
generate convincing, fabricated audio and video recordings at a rapid pace in 
the next few years,” which, one commentator notes, “will take fake news to a 
whole new level.”14 Another stresses that “[a]lready available tools for audio 
and video manipulation . . . have begun to look like a potential fake news 
Manhattan Project.”15 In a recent post on Lawfare Blog, Bobby Chesney and 
Danielle Citron describe such technologically generated illusions as “deep 
fakes”—a phrase that has been most often used to describe a genre of 
artificial-intelligence-generated pornography that makes celebrities appear to 
engage in sexual scenes they had nothing to do with.
16
 Chesney and Citron 
describe the generation of deep fakes more broadly as “digital manipulation 
of sound, images, or video to impersonate someone or make it appear that a 
person did something—and to do so in a manner that is increasingly realistic, 
to the point that the unaided observer cannot detect the fake.”17 They further 
note that deep fakes are not likely to remain the province of governments or 
extraordinarily powerful corporations, but will rather “diffuse rapidly and 
                                                                                                                 
 13. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 289 (Samaira Book Publishers 2017) (1949).  
 14. Hilke Schellmann, The Dangerous New Technology That Will Make Us Question 
Our Basic Idea of Reality, QUARTZ (Dec. 5, 2017), https://qz.com/1145657/the-dangerous-
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 15. Charlie Warzel, He Predicted the 2016 Fake News Crisis. Now He’s Worried About 
an Information Apocalypse, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
charliewarzel/the-terrifying-future-of-fake-newsfakenews?utm_term=.ofPnjaMqa#.ehdR6 
MXYM.  
 16. Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for National 
Security, Democracy and Privacy?, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog. 
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 17. Id.  
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globally” and “end up in the hands of a vast range of actors willing to use 
deep fakes in harmful ways.”18 
Given the havoc that would surely ensue if individuals engaged in a kind 
of informational Hobbesian war of all against all—with people constantly 
falsifying one another’s sense of what is real—it makes sense to ask whether 
government has the power to take measures against this sort of action. It is, 
after all, government that social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke 
looked to help individuals escape from the insecurity of a “state of nature” 
where individuals were constantly vulnerable to physical attack from their 
neighbors. Might government likewise protect people against informational 
attack?  
One potential barrier for government regulation of information attack, of 
course, is the First Amendment. Deep fakes, for example, are generally video 
or audio creations, and such creations have typically been considered a form 
of expression. So too is a painting created in the style of Rembrandt, perhaps 
so faithfully that even viewers educated in art history will mistake it for a 
Rembrandt painting. Do these types of expression receive First Amendment 
protection even when they are intended to deceive, and succeed in their 
deception? If they are protected by free speech guarantees, then how is 
government to protect people from the kind of havoc which writers predict 
may arise from deep fakes? If, on the other hand, they are not protected, then 
does this also open the door for government to restrict other kinds of 
expression—beyond doctored video- or audiotapes—such as false evidence 
of events that takes the form of words rather than video footage? If the First 
Amendment does not present a barrier to regulating deep fakes, why then 
would it present a barrier to government restriction of “fake news” that takes 
the form of a false Tweet or Facebook post? Or a factual claim about public 
affairs—falsely made by a skilled and persuasive speaker—to an audience 
ready to believe it? 
My purpose in this Essay is to use these questions as a starting point for 
taking another look at a question that has been thoughtfully explored in recent 
free speech jurisprudence and scholarship. Namely, when does factually false 
expression qualify for First Amendment protection, and when it does not? In 
the past two years, this question has been raised about fake news, a vague 
phrase that refers to efforts to spread false information about public affairs or 
publicly known individuals, principally over the Internet, by means as simple 
as making the false claim in a Tweet, or as sophisticated as creating a fake 
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/5
2018]       LIES, LINE DRAWING & (DEEP) FAKE NEWS 63 
 
 
but seemingly real imitation of a newspaper or other established media (and 
perhaps fake photographic evidence to accompany it). This Essay does not 
offer a definitive answer to the question of when the falsity in fake news 
might fail to receive the First Amendment protection that normally applies to 
expression of all kinds (including false and inaccurate information). Nor will 
it offer a definitive answer to the question of whether and when deep fakes 
might receive First Amendment protection when they deceive with video- or 
audio-alteration rather than verbal expression.  
Instead, this Essay aims to explore and reflect on the merits of some of the 
key legal frameworks that judges and scholars have offered for addressing 
such questions and to outline an additional proposal that is especially relevant 
to the problem of fabricated video and audio. It begins in Part II by 
introducing the key framework that the Supreme Court has offered for 
thinking about such issues, particularly the discussion among the Justices in 
United States v. Alvarez
19
 about when lying should count as protected free 
speech. As explained below, the key lesson of Alvarez for the regulation of 
fake news or politically relevant deep fakes is that, so long as their content is 
a matter of public concern—as most news of any kind is—then it can be 
proscribed by government only if it falls into a historically unprotected 
category of expression such as fraud or defamation. 
 In Parts III and IV, I will explore some possible variations of this model—
each of which modestly expands the kind of false speech that government 
may regulate. Part III examines three possible bases, discussed in other 
scholars’ work, for how one might do so. Lies about politics, philosophy, 
history, and other matters of public concern might be subject to restriction not 
only when they cause “legally cognizable harm,” but also (i) when they are 
exceptions to the general assumption that false claims about public events or 
political subjects are, by their very nature, matters of public concern, or (ii) 
when they do one or both of the following: (a) knowingly manipulate a 
listener with false information to serve the speaker’s ends rather than his 
own, or (b) provide the listener with unfounded expert knowledge or other 
claims that an asymmetry in information makes the listener ill-equipped to 
critically assess. Neither of these, I will argue, seems all that likely to make a 
significant difference in how the Alvarez framework gets applied.  
In Part IV, however, I will identify something that may do so, particularly 
given recent technological developments. Fake news may lose protection, I 
suggest, when it is not only a falsity, but a forgery as well. In other words, a 
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distinctive type of harm may arise when the falsehood is not merely in the 
content of the speech that is intended to deceive, but is also in its purported 
source or vehicle. This is not limited to situations where video or audio make 
nonexistent events seem real. Imagine, for example, that a news story reaches 
its audience and, in doing so, provides the audience with fake content while 
masquerading as another publication. The story could, for example, come in 
the guise of an article by the Washington Post or the Miami Herald, though 
neither publication played any role in it. The falsity in such expression is not 
only in a statement contained within the writing, but in way the writing is 
disguised as an authoritative journalistic source.  
II. Alvarez, “Low Value” Speech, and Lying 
Before delving into the legal questions posed by so-called deep fakes—the 
“potential fake news Manhattan Project” discussed above—it is useful to 
briefly explore some more familiar examples of fake news that are a part of 
the present, rather than a dystopian near-future. On September 30, 2016—just 
over a month before the presidential election—the website for the Christian 
Times Newspaper exposed a carefully hidden plan that that was supposed to 
have remained a secret from voters: tens of thousands of fake ballots sat in an 
Ohio warehouse, ready to be used on election day to swing the election 
results in Ohio, overriding the voters’ wishes and assuring the election 
outcome desired by the secretive operation that created the fake ballots.
20
 
Accompanying the story was a photograph of the electrician who had 
stumbled upon the scheme, standing behind the many ballot-filled boxes.
21
 
Except, in the end, it was not these hidden ballots that were fraudulent, but 
the news story that “revealed” them. As the New York Times reported four 
months later, the Christian Times Newspaper was not a real newspaper.
22
 It 
was a website created by a recent college graduate trying to make some 
money off of fake news by putting concrete evidence behind the vague fear, 
expressed by many Trump supporters at the time, that Hillary Clinton’s 
campaign was preparing to steal the election.
23
 The photograph in the story 
was real, but it had nothing to do with ballots in Ohio: “It was a photo from 
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The Birmingham Mail, showing a British election 3,700 miles from 
Columbus.”24 Nothing in the photo clearly revealed that or contradicted the 
caption, which set it in the United States and characterized it as depicting the 
Trump-Clinton contest.
25
 
This was only one of a multitude of fake news stories that ran prior to the 
2016 election. Enterprising young workers in Veles, Macedonia produced 
hundreds of articles attempting to draw interest from politically obsessed 
American internet users—along with the advertising revenue their “clicks” 
would bring.
26
 One of these stories, for example, revealed that Hillary Clinton 
had said in 2013 that people “Like Donald Trump” should “Run For Office” 
because “They’re Honest And Can’t Be Bought.”27 As the indictment 
obtained by Special Counsel Robert Mueller recently recounted, the Russian 
Internet Research Agency likewise contributed to the confusion in election 
reporting by borrowing real—and inventing fake—American identities, such 
as a Twitter account purportedly run by the Tennessee GOP, to spread 
misinformation.
28
 
Nor is fake news the only fake information reporters have raised concerns 
about. In 2013, a journalist for Science (trained as a biologist) revealed how 
easy it had been for him to get fake science accepted for publication in over a 
hundred open-access science journals, some run by well-known and 
established publishing companies.
29
 He explained in his Science exposé that 
he had written an analysis demonstrating “the anticancer properties of a 
chemical . . . extracted from a lichen.”30 He then submitted a variation of this 
made-up study to over 300 open-access journals (under a false name and 
false institutional affiliation, with a made-up university) to see how many 
would be duped by it.
31
 “More than half of the journals accepted the paper,” 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Craig Silverman & Lawrence Alexander, How Teens in the Balkans Are Duping 
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(D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), 2018 WL 914777. 
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he noted, “failing to notice its fatal flaws,” which included a graph that 
showed results flatly at odds with those claimed by the paper itself.
32
  
Does First Amendment doctrine allow, and should it allow, government to 
punish such fake news, junk science, and other false statements of fact? 
Where such falsity is used not to test journals’ quality control, as the Science 
journalist did, but in order to deceive the public into accepting its truth, 
should legislatures be able to subject the speaker to civil or criminal liability? 
The most familiar answer in First Amendment caselaw is no. As explained 
below, all of the Justices in Alvarez found that allowing the government to 
punish lying on matters of public concern would require inviting it to monitor 
and screen out elements of public discourse in a way that is at odds with First 
Amendment principles. But it is useful to explore more carefully how most 
First Amendment analyses reach this conclusion.  
Intuitively, the First Amendment status of fake new or fake science might 
well depend in part on what kind of fakery one believes is involved in fake 
news or fake science. If it is like the kind of forgery or faking one finds in the 
commercial sphere, then government probably has some room to regulate and 
to restrict it. In the commercial marketplace, government often stands 
ready to intervene in order to protect consumers from deception. For 
instance, it protects us against being sold forgeries or other fake goods. 
Prosecutors bring cases against those who peddle counterfeit 
pharmaceuticals,
33
 travel scams,
34
 fake concert tickets,
35
 or other goods 
that aren’t what they purport to be. And government may generally 
intervene in this way even where the deception is carried out through, or 
consists of, expression. The sale of an artistic forgery can be a crime,
36
 as 
can sale of a fake celebrity autograph.
37
  
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id. 
 33. See John Roth, Counterfeit Drugs: Prosecuting the Profiteers, Protecting the Public 
Health, FDA VOICE (Jul. 15, 2013), https://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2013/07/ 
counterfeit-drugs-prosecuting-the-profiteers-protecting-the-public-health/. 
 34. See 10 Accused of Scamming More than $1 Million in New York City Travel Agency 
Scheme, ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014), http://abc7ny.com/travel/10-accused-of-scamming-
more-than-$1-million-in-nyc-travel-agency-scheme/434520/.  
 35. Victor Fiorillo, Feds Charge Philly Man in Fake Bruce Springsteen Tickets Scheme, 
PHILADELPHIA (Dec. 19, 2016, 12:39 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/news/2016/12/19/ 
fake-bruce-springsteen-tickets/#lsoSymKGSHv6W0fX.99. 
 36. See Christine E. Weller, Lessons from Two Recent Art Forgery Cases, 3 STETSON J. 
ADVOC. & L. 1 (2016) (discussing U.S. laws used to prosecute crimes related to art fraud). 
 37. John Meyers, Gov. Brown Signs Law That Cracks Down on Fake Celebrity 
Autographs, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 9. 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-
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Such governmental restriction of deception is not limited to the 
commercial context. It is often illegal to make false statements where 
government needs honest answers to questions or needs to assure there is 
no deception about who is authorized to take actions that only 
government officials may permissibly take.
38
 State laws typically ban 
people from impersonating police officers or other government officials,
39
 
from email “spoofing”40 or other use of fake online identities to cause 
harm to others,
41
 from creating or using fake IDs to enter airports or other 
secure areas,
42
 and from lying to building or restaurant inspectors.
43
 By 
doing so, government enables us to move through public life without the 
kind of paralyzing paranoia that might be necessary where everyone and 
everything around us might be a potentially harmful impostor. 
Government is thus, in this sphere of our lives, very much expected to 
actively identify and, in a sense, quarantine and neutralize, falsehoods.  
Matters are very different, however, in the “marketplace of ideas.” 
Here, individuals are largely on their own: government may not 
constitutionally exile certain ideas from the free trade in ideas as it can 
ban harmful goods or services from the realm of buying and selling. As 
the Supreme Court declared in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., “Under the 
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However 
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
                                                                                                                 
sac-essential-politics-updates-gov-brown-signs-law-that-cracks-down-1473451218-html 
story.html. 
 38. See Helen Klein Murillo, The Law of Lying: Perjury, False Statements, and 
Obstruction, LAWFARE (Mar. 22, 2017, 9:30 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-lying-
perjury-false-statements-and-obstruction. 
 39. See United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding the First 
Amendment permitted “Virginia police impersonation statute, Virginia Code § 18.2–174, 
[which] prohibits individuals from falsely assuming or pretending to be a law enforcement 
officer”). 
 40. See L. Richard Fischer & Shannon K. Ryerson, New York Arrests Spammer for E-
Mail Spoofing, PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP., May 2003, at 19. 
 41. See Victor Luckerson, Can You Go to Jail for Impersonating Someone Online?, 
TIME (Jan. 22, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/01/22/can-you-go-to-jail-for-
impersonating-someone-online/. 
 42. See, e.g., Man Arrested with Fake ID at Sanford Airport, Authorities Say, WESH2 
(May 26, 2016), http://www.wesh.com/article/man-arrested-with-fake-id-at-sanford-airport-
authorities-say/4449756. 
 43. See Former Niagara Falls Man Sentenced for Making a False Statement, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdny/pr/former-niagara-falls-
man-sentenced-making-false-statement. 
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conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”44 
Thus, government cannot deal with a person’s claim of being “cheated” 
into adopting the wrong spiritual commitment or political ideology in the 
way it deals with a person’s claim that she was duped into buying a fake 
concert ticket, a forged piece of art, or a car that lacks the features its 
seller touted. She may deeply regret having lived for years with a 
religious commitment she now regards as erroneous. She may likewise 
deeply regret having furthered a political ideology and advocated for 
policies she now regards as damaging. And she may bitterly resent what 
she sees as the misleading words of a proselytizer or passionate advocate 
who helped bring her to the religion or political camp she now firmly 
rejects. But American democracy gives government neither the power to 
investigate and shutter the church or the political group she regrets 
joining, nor the power to prevent new members from entering. 
Government’s role here is to stand back and let individuals judge for 
themselves whether ideas are worthy of adherence. In the realm of ideas, 
wrote Justice Jackson in 1945, “every person must be his own watchman 
for truth, because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate 
the true from the false for us.”45  
Where then do we classify fake news or junk science, like the kind I 
described earlier, in this dichotomy? Are false articles or bogus science 
more like goods we purchase that aren’t what they purport to be, or are 
they more like spiritual or political ideas, where it is up to us, not the 
government, to decide which ideas we will treat as true? On the one hand, 
fake news or science articles aren’t generally products we rely upon to 
fulfill a specific, practical purpose. They are not like a set of tickets we 
purchase to get entry to concert or sporting event, which will entirely fail 
to serve their purpose if they are fake. They are rather more like the heap 
of other potentially mistaken or unwise claims—about politics, religion, 
and a host of other topics—that each of us has to sort through and 
evaluate in order to figure out what to believe about the world and how to 
build good lives in it. But on the other hand, false factual statements are 
unlike religious ideas and political opinions in at least one respect: they 
can be exposed as fake. In this respect, they are more like a forged work 
of art that purports to be a fifteenth century Da Vinci painting but is 
                                                                                                                 
 44. 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974). 
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neither from that time period nor the creation of Da Vinci. The fake news 
article above was not from a real newspaper, and the writer did not base it 
on any evidence of real events. The fake science article described above 
wasn’t based on actual results or genuine scientific analysis.  
For the Justices in United States v. Alvarez, the likely answer is that 
absent legally cognizable harm, fake news and fake science fall squarely 
in the same category as protected speech. Like religious ideas and 
political opinions, they are staunchly protected against government 
censorship. It might seem odd to describe that 2012 case as offering a 
single answer of any kind to this question. The Court split three ways, 
with no majority opinion. The specific question that the Justices confronted 
was whether Congress could constitutionally subject a person, like Xavier 
Alvarez, to criminal liability for doing what Alvarez had done—namely, to 
falsely claim that he had received a Congressional Medal of Honor for 
battlefield heroism that he had never shown on a battlefield where he had 
never fought.
46
 Both Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion and Justice Breyer’s 
concurrence agreed that false statements are protected speech.
47
 They also 
agreed that, in this case, the First Amendment barred Congress from 
criminalizing Alvarez’s speech when it had other ways of combatting the 
effects of his falsehoods—by, for example, creating a public website with an 
authorized list of Medal of Honor winners that could show that Alvarez was 
not among them.
48
 But they disagreed on how much protection the First 
Amendment provides to false statements of fact, with Justice Kennedy 
insisting that, absent a showing of legally cognizable harm, false statements 
are just as protected as any other speech
49
 and Justice Breyer arguing 
government should generally have more leeway to regulate verifiably false 
statements than it has to restrict other speech content.
50
  
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, by contrast, would have upheld 
Congress’s statutory measure to combat an “epidemic of false claims about 
military decorations,” and would have found that the government acted 
constitutionally when it punished Alvarez for contributing his own false 
claim to this epidemic.
51
 More generally, he argued, “false factual statements 
possess no intrinsic First Amendment value,” and should receive no First 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. at 713. 
 47. Id. at 724 (plurality opinion); id. at 730–31 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 48. Id. at 729. 
 49. Id. at 719 (plurality opinion). 
 50. Id. at 730–31 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Amendment protection except where such protection is necessary to provide 
sufficient breathing space for true statements on related subjects.
52
 
Yet however much the Justices may have disagreed about the First 
Amendment status of Alvarez’s false claims and similar autobiographical 
lies, there was much they did agree upon—and this agreement reflected 
aspects of First Amendment doctrine with a decades-long history. They 
agreed, first of all, that some types of false speech—like false speech on 
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other matters 
of public concern”—receive the same robust protection that political or 
artistic expression or expression about the humanities and social sciences 
receives in other contexts.
53
 Despite the falsity of these contributions to 
public discourse, they are still contributions to public discourse and, as such, 
an integral part of the democratic deliberation that the First Amendment 
strongly insulates from government management. This provides us with an 
important starting point for analyzing the First Amendment status of fake 
news and fake science. Both these types of falsity seem to deserve a place on 
this list. The above-cited fake news article about the 2016 presidential 
election and the integrity of Ohio ballots was unquestionably about a matter 
of public concern. It was an instance of the kind of political speech that the 
Court has often said is at the core of the First Amendment. Scientific debates 
likewise seem to be the kind of debates that even the Alvarez dissent would 
place off limits to government control. 
There is, however, a second point of agreement among the Justices, and it 
might allow for government regulation of fake news or similar false 
statements in at least some circumstances: false speech that causes certain 
legally cognizable harms can be punished or subjected to civil liability 
without raising significant First Amendment concerns.
54
 Government may 
punish or subject to liability the harm that defamation causes to reputation, 
that fraud causes to one’s property rights, or that perjury causes to judicial 
truth-finding.
55
 Even where a lie concerns a political topic, this doesn’t mean 
it can never count as defamation, fraud, or perjury. A person can commit 
perjury by lying to hide an election law violation.
56
 A newspaper reporter can 
                                                                                                                 
 52. Id. at 746. 
 53. Id. at 751; see also id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. at 718 (plurality opinion). 
 55. Id. at 718–22. 
 56. See Associated Press, Former GOP Senate Candidate Convicted of Violating South 
Dakota Election Law, FOX NEWS: POL. (May 28, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/ 
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defame a public official by making knowingly or recklessly false claims 
about that official’s alleged failures or wrongs.57 If the author of a real 
newspaper article can defame the person it reports on, this can also, of course, 
be true of the kind of fake news article that is often constructed around an 
intentional lie. Consequently, if the political, historical, or scientific focus of 
a false account places that account safely inside the scope of the First 
Amendment, a legally cognizable harm caused by that account can push it 
out.
58
 
In short, the Justices in Alvarez agreed that government could generally 
restrict certain harmful false statements, such as those involving fraud, 
without raising First Amendment concerns.
59
 By contrast, they also 
agreed that where false statements arise in public debate and concern 
matters where disagreement is an inevitable and desirable part of that 
debate—matters such as philosophy, history, social science, and art—
then the speaker of that falsity should be just as protected as she is when 
she speaks a truth.
60
  
This two-part consensus about free speech and falsity had roots not 
only in prior cases, but also in familiar understandings about where 
government can and cannot freely regulate the claims we make about our 
activities. I noted above that government frequently prosecutes those who 
sell fake or counterfeit goods or make material misrepresentations to 
consumers. This would be impossible unless the First Amendment left 
government free to punish lies that caused legally cognizable harms. As 
Justice Kennedy wrote in Alvarez, “[w]here false claims are made to 
effect a fraud or secure moneys or other valuable considerations, say 
offers of employment, it is well established that the Government may 
restrict speech without affronting the First Amendment.”61 By contrast, 
where false speech is an inextricable part of the debates and deliberations 
we engage in to think through our political commitments, policy choices, 
                                                                                                                 
2015/05/28/former-gop-senate-candidate-convicted-violating-south-dakota-election-law. 
html (detailing Annette Bosworth’s conviction for violation of election law). 
 57. See, e.g., Ball v. E.W. Scripps, Co., 801 S.W.2d 684, 689 (Ky. 1990) (upholding 
jury’s finding of actual malice in newspaper’s reporting about County Prosecutor). 
 58. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
 59. Id. at 729. 
 60. Id. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 723 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
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or religious preferences, it is in a realm which government generally has 
no legitimate claim to manage.
62
 
This contrast—between a government’s duty to actively patrol 
falsehoods in the realm of commerce and security and its obligation to 
refrain from doing so in the realm of ideas—has deeper roots in liberal 
political theory. A century before the Constitution’s enactment, John 
Locke wrote in A Letter Concerning Toleration that government is not 
only authorized, but also duty bound to protect “life, liberty, health, and 
indolence of body, and the possession of outward things such as money, 
lands, houses, furniture, and the like.”63 Protecting our physical security 
and property, he argued, is the reason to submit to government in the first 
place. The “part of the magistrate,” he argued, “is . . . to take care that the 
commonwealth receive no prejudice, and that there be no injury done to 
any man, either in life or estate.”64 So government must be given room to 
perform this role; it has to be able to protect against harm to our persons 
and property, including harm of the sort that occurs, in part, through 
deception.  
What government was not free to do, under Locke’s framework, was to 
claim authority over the “care of the soul,” or the inward realm of 
conscience.
65
 Government’s role is not, for instance, to tell us what 
religious doctrine is deserving of our adherence. And even where 
opinions are clearly “false and absurd,” government’s role, insisted 
Locke, “is not to provide for the truth of opinions.”66 Instead, it is to 
assure “safety and security of the commonwealth.”67 For Locke, as for 
American jurists who followed, it was for the individual, not the 
government, to decide what is true in the realm of conscience.
68
 Locke 
was primarily interested in keeping government from interfering in our 
religious lives, but modern-day judges are just as emphatic that 
government avoid interfering in our formation of political and other 
opinions. As Justice Jackson emphasized in Thomas v. Collins, it is not 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See, e.g., James Weinstein, Free Speech and Domain Allocation: A Suggested 
Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Prohibitions of Lies in Political 
Campaigns, 71 OKLA. L. REV 167, 206–13 (2018). 
 63. JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 10 (Hudderfeld 1796) (1689). 
 64. Id. at 40. 
 65. Id. at 27. 
 66. Id. at 48. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 33 (stating that “men cannot be forced to be saved” and that “when all is done, 
they must be left to their own consciences”). 
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only in the realm of religion where government is barred from 
authoritatively distinguishing true and false doctrine.
69
 Rather, 
government is barred more generally from “assuming a guardianship of 
the public mind.”70 It is barred from telling people what may and may not 
be a legitimate component of public discourse.  
It is thus not surprising that, as the Court of the late twentieth century 
shaped First Amendment free speech law into a more libertarian, 
government-limiting doctrine than it had once been, it roughly followed 
this Lockean template. Indeed, the Court generally divided activity 
between a realm of physical and financial interactions, where government 
has a crucial role in securing safety and property, and a realm of ideas, 
where government must generally let individuals shape their own thought 
free from government interference.  
As I have emphasized before, this Lockean model of government gives 
us one way to help make sense of why the Court has identified certain 
exceptions to what is, in current First Amendment doctrine, a “bedrock 
principle” that speech may not be restricted by government on the basis 
of the ideas it communicates:
71
 while government may not generally 
target certain speech content for restriction, it may do so when the content 
falls into a particular category the court has recognized as unprotected by 
free speech law or (in the case of commercial speech) less protected than 
other kinds of expression.
72
  
The First Amendment, for example, does not place any high judicial 
hurdles in government’s way when the speech it wishes to restrict 
consists of “true threats” that communicate a serious intent to commit 
unlawful violence,
73
 defamation,
74
 commercial speech,
75
 or certain other 
                                                                                                                 
 69. 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression 
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); see also 
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“As a general matter, . . . 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
matter, or its content.”). 
 72. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
 73. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 74. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 399, 406. 
 75. Id. at 383–86; Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (stating 
that the Supreme Court has afforded “commercial speech a limited measure of protection, 
commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values”). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
74 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:59 
 
 
kinds of content. In at least some cases, the Court has suggested that the 
reason the First Amendment allows government to regulate such speech 
is that such speech is not only expressing ideas, but also has powerful 
effects on the realm of activity where government is duty bound to 
protect personal security and property. For example, true threats are 
inextricably linked to potential violence,
76
 and commercial speech is 
“inextricably intertwined” with buying, selling, and the possible fraud 
that can accompany it.
77
 These realms of speech, in other words, do not 
merely involve exchange of thought. Instead, they frequently have 
powerful and predictable effects in the realm of security and property that 
most liberal theorists since Locke have identified as the natural realm for 
vigorous government oversight and action.  
This is not to say that First Amendment doctrine’s definition of 
unprotected speech categories maps perfectly onto the Lockean 
distinction between the outward realm of the state and individuals’ 
autonomy in matters of religion or other opinion. First, some categories of 
unprotected speech do not clearly implicate the state’s duty to protect 
personal security and property. Unlike commercial speech regulations 
that protect individuals from deceptive or coercive commercial actors, or 
proscriptions of true threats that protect physical security, obscenity 
regulations seem to protect readers’ mental welfare and culture (unless, 
perhaps, one can justify them as needed to combat certain physical harms 
that can arise from obscene speech). And certain speech torts may raise 
similar problems. First Amendment law allows states to impose liability 
for invasion of privacy, and it may not be clear why the state’s duties to 
protect security and property give it any more power to restrict privacy-
damaging speech (such as that in “public disclosure of private facts”) than 
any other kind of speech. 
Second, it is not only unprotected speech that can have powerful 
effects on security and property. Speech protected by current First 
Amendment doctrine often concerns those interests as well. It is not only 
commercial speech that may strongly impact our financial condition, but 
also the staunchly protected expression individuals exercise when they 
exhort policymakers or their fellow citizens to adopt economic policies 
that are protectionist, socialist, or libertarian in character, or when they 
argue for one understanding of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence 
                                                                                                                 
 76. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003). 
 77. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993). 
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rather than another. Speech in the political realm, after all, is not generally 
designed only for the purpose of providing material for abstract debates; 
it is meant to persuade people to take certain actions, to make a concrete 
difference in the world.  
Still, it is at least plausible for courts and legal theorists to explain why 
most unprotected categories of speech content are unprotected by first 
emphasizing the effects they have on our physical security or financial 
condition. Unlike proposals for a certain economic policy, threats of 
violence are not meant as a contribution to deliberations in which a 
listener can consider and then accept or reject them. Nor, one might 
argue, are offers of sale or purchase, which are offered not as ideas to be 
critically assessed but as appeals to a listener to take some economic 
action in the near future. There may well be some arbitrariness and 
artificiality in trying to classify speech as falling on one side or the other 
of Locke’s line between the realm of outward things—those that affect 
our physical security and property, for example—and the realm of inward 
deliberation, opinion formation, and conscience.
78
 But one might argue 
that, under our First Amendment jurisprudence, which embraces at least 
some expressive or informational libertarianism, courts have to insulate 
some deliberative spaces from state control. It requires them to at least 
attempt to make some distinction between the words or arts that lie 
squarely in the realm of expression and belief and the words or arts that 
are a commercial product (like a forged artwork sold on the marketplace) 
or serve as an instrument of financial harm or potential violence. Some 
such distinction seems necessary if courts are to draw a line between 
realms where government can actively regulate false speech that could 
defraud us or damage our health, and those where the First Amendment 
bars government from identifying and restricting allegedly inaccurate 
claims about religion or politics. 
It may also be the case that categories of unprotected or less-protected 
speech are left more vulnerable to government regulation by existing free 
speech doctrine not only because of what such speech does, but also 
because of what it does not do. Commentators sometimes refer to these 
categories of speech as “low-value” speech on the theory that they are 
less likely than political speech, artistic expression, or other robustly 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutral 
Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 657 (2002). 
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protected expression to advance the core values of the First Amendment, 
such as promoting self-governance or enhancing individual autonomy.
79
 
The Court first suggested that certain types of speech content are 
undeserving of full First Amendment protection in 1942. In Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire, the Court held that free speech law does not protect use 
of “fighting words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”80 The Court might have 
justified this conclusion by simply explaining that fighting words are 
inextricably linked to violent activity the state has a duty to prevent or 
stop (like the true threats it later made clear also lack First Amendment 
protection
81
). But it instead placed greater emphasis not on the harms that 
fighting words cause, but rather on value they fail to deliver. Unlike other 
expression, said the Court, fighting words form “no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by 
the social interest in order and morality.”82  
It is not clear, however, that the Court still adheres to this view that 
unprotected categories of speech are unprotected because they lack the 
First Amendment value one typically finds in expression. In R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, the Court seemed to forcefully limit the view that 
fighting words could never form an “essential part of any exposition of 
ideas,” or that their value is in all respects “worthless.”83 On the contrary, 
Justice Scalia explained, fighting words may well include a message—
and while the violence-generating potential of fighting words is not 
protected, the message is.
84
 The Court here analogized government’s 
restriction of low-value speech to government’s regulation of expressive 
conduct or of the non-speech effects of protest activity: when government 
restricts protesters’ burning of draft cards85 or blocking of streets,86 it is 
                                                                                                                 
 79. See Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARVARD L. REV 
2166, 2221 (2015). 
 80. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 81. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 82. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
 83. 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992) (citing Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 572). 
 84. Id. at 386–87. 
 85. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369, 370, 376–77 (1968). 
 86. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768–770 (1994) (upholding 
constitutionality of a thirty-six foot buffer zone near an abortion clinic entrance and noting 
the state’s “strong interest in ensuring the public safety and order, in promoting the free flow 
of traffic on public streets and sidewalks, and in protecting the property rights of all its 
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allowed to counter the physical threat or disruption raised by the burning 
or blocking. But it is not allowed by First Amendment law to use its 
property- and safety-protecting power as a pretext for silencing anti-
government messages.
87
 In the same way, Justice Scalia noted in R.A.V., 
government can protect us from the violence threatened by fighting words 
(or true threats), but not as a pretext for crushing the messages that 
accompany such intimidation or triggers of violence.
88
 This holding 
appears to assume that fighting words, true threats, and other historically 
unprotected content can serve as vehicles for communicating ideas
89
 and 
are thus fair game for government regulation not because they lack such 
ideas, but because—and only to the extent that—they communicate them 
in a way that threatens harms that government must have power to 
regulate in order to fulfill the duties it owes to the public.
90
  
In any event, the above analysis suggests that there are at least two 
reasons that certain kinds of speech content either fall outside of the First 
Amendment’s scope or receive weaker shielding from it. Each of these 
may help explain why some kinds of lies or other false statements are 
unprotected. One reason is that while ideas are normally insulated from 
government control, the expression of ideas can take a form that causes or 
threatens harm to person or property. This can happen not only when the 
physical manner of the expression creates a risk of such harm (through 
non-speech conduct, like burning a flag or occupying space in a way that, 
for example, affects traffic safety), but also because certain kinds of 
words or speech content can itself cause risks by, for example, conveying 
a threat of violence or perpetuating commercial fraud. To the extent a lie 
or other falsity is, in part, the source of such a harm, it may well be 
outside of the First Amendment.  
This helps explain the first of the two points of consensus previously 
identified in United States v. Alvarez: that certain kinds of false 
statements—like defamation, fraud, or perjury—lie outside the First 
Amendment because of the harm they work. This is not to say that the 
Court stands ready to deny First Amendment protection to a category of 
speech any time that it can be linked to physical or property-related harm. 
                                                                                                                 
citizens”) (citing Operation Rescue v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 672 (Fla. 
1993)).  
 87. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987). 
 88. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 385–86. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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On the contrary, it has expressly refused to use such a rationale to create 
new exceptions to First Amendment protection, stating in United States v. 
Stevens that courts did not have “freewheeling authority to declare new 
categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”91 Still, 
the fact that historically unprotected categories of speech tend to produce 
harm of a kind government has long been duty bound to protect against 
helps to explain why they have been historically unprotected, and perhaps 
to better define the boundaries of categories such as true threats or 
commercial speech.
92
 
Second, a type of speech might be unprotected by the First 
Amendment when it lacks the value that justifies First Amendment 
protection, providing another potential basis for denying free speech 
protection to some kinds of lies. Lies might fall outside the First 
Amendment’s coverage if and when they are devoid of the kind of value 
that justifies free speech protection, or where their restriction poses no 
threat to such values. If, as some scholars suggest, the First Amendment 
exists to promote an individual’s autonomy93 or provide a foundation for 
democratic deliberation and collective self-government,
94
 there is a case 
to be made that most factual falsehoods fail to further such purposes—
and are more likely to undermine them. This helps explain why the 
concurrence and dissent in Alvarez are more comfortable with giving 
government more leeway to restrict lies on matters other than 
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other 
matters of public concern.”95 Lies that arise in discussion of the latter 
topics are more likely to have First Amendment value themselves (or be 
inextricably intertwined with robust debate that does) than are lies 
unconnected to discussions which illuminate scientific or philosophical 
questions or forge policy in democratic discourse.  
                                                                                                                 
 91. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010). Courts may, however, recognize 
categories that have “been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically 
identified or discussed as such in our case law.” Id. 
 92. Id. at 470. 
 93. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 50 (1989); 
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 620 (1982). 
 94. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. 
REV. 245, 255; see also James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of 
American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 513 (2011); Robert Post, Participatory 
Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 482 (2011). 
 95. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 751 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting); see also 
id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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These two rationales for denying First Amendment protection to 
certain kinds of speech, including certain kinds of false statements, are 
not mutually exclusive. One might argue that there are times they 
essentially merge into one another: the harm generated by an unprotected 
category of speech may itself consist of the fact that it undermines a 
certain free-speech value where we rely on constitutional protections to 
further it. Thus, Steven Heyman and Christina Wells have each offered 
distinctive arguments that many low-value categories of speech are low 
value because they undermine the capacities for individual autonomy that 
free speech rights are supposed to protect and enhance.
96
 But it is helpful 
to recognize that excluding certain speech from the First Amendment’s 
scope on the basis of the nature of the harm it causes is conceptually 
distinct from doing so on the basis that it lacks First Amendment value. 
These two possible bases for treating certain speech as unprotected 
sometimes operate separately. As noted earlier, the Court in R.A.V. v. City 
of St. Paul seemed to argue that fighting words can be proscribed because 
of the harm they cause—not because they lack expressive value, but in 
spite of that value. And unlike the dissent in Alvarez, which argues that 
lies about one’s personal life can typically be regulated (at least in part) 
because they “possess no intrinsic First Amendment value,”97 the 
plurality opinion finds factual falsity no less valuable or less worthy of 
First Amendment protection than arguments that are “unreasoned” or 
“uninformed,” and excludes such lies from the scope of free speech only 
when they generate “legally cognizable harm.”98 
The consequence, in any case, is that whatever rationale is adopted for 
identifying unprotected or less-protected speech categories and explaining 
why they are outside, or at the outer edges of, the First Amendment, the 
Justices in Alvarez all appeared to agree at least that the realm of false 
statements fits with this double level of more and less protected speech. 
Lies that have consequences for financial wellbeing, physical safety, or 
the wielding of government’s coercive force (as the result of a trial, for 
example) can be targeted or penalized by government. This is true, at the 
very least because of the harm they raise, and also, perhaps, because they 
lack the value that inheres in mistaken or misleading political, 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See Heyman, supra note 78; Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating Autonomy: Freedom 
and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 159, 188–95 (1997). 
 97. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 746 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 719 (plurality opinion). 
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philosophical, or historical claims. Other false statements occur in the 
realm of vigorous religious, political, or other public debates largely 
insulated from government control. They may lead us to adopt spiritual, 
philosophical, or political commitments we come to regret—but these are 
not the kind of harms government has any role in correcting. And they 
occur in debates and intellectual explorations whose value would be very 
much at risk if government were allowed to interfere. 
The focus of the disagreement between the Justices in Alvarez was in 
how to assess both the risk of harm and the value at stake in false 
speech—like Xavier Alvarez’s false claim to have won a Medal of 
Honor—that, at first glance at least, fits into neither of the above two 
categories. Alvarez’s claim was not a claim about philosophy, politics, 
religion, science, or some other discipline for how individuals should 
understand their place in the world. Neither was it a claim regarding how 
Americans should understand their country and the policies that would 
best serve it. It was simply an assertion that Alvarez had earned a badge 
of heroism he hadn’t earned.99 Thus, it didn’t automatically receive the 
robust First Amendment protection that all Justices would offer to claims 
made about matters of public concern or other areas of knowledge where 
there is robust disagreement and debate. 
Nor did Alvarez’s boast cause a kind of harm that had traditionally 
subjected speech to common law liability or criminal punishment. 
Alvarez didn’t perjure himself, make a defamatory claim about someone 
else, defraud others, or otherwise cause a recognized form of legally 
cognizable harm. So his fabrication wasn’t automatically excluded from 
the First Amendment scope as all of these false statements are. 
For Justice Kennedy and the plurality, this lack of legally cognizable 
harm was decisive—if Alvarez’s lie wasn’t the type that is excluded from 
free speech coverage, then Alvarez must still be inside of (and shielded 
by) First Amendment’s protection for expressive freedom.100 For Justice 
Alito and the dissent, by contrast, the lack of First Amendment value in 
Alvarez’s mundane lie about a fact concerning his own past was decisive 
in a different way. Utter falsity, in the dissenters’ opinion, has no value, 
and where government restriction of it raises no risk for free and vigorous 
                                                                                                                 
99.It is still possible to claim that such a false claim about one’s own history might be a 
statement about a matter of “public concern” and I consider why this might be the case 
below. See infra notes 126–130 and accompanying text.  
 100. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 719. 
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public debate, there is no reason for the First Amendment to prevent such 
restriction.
101
  
For the concurrence, by contrast, the challenge presented by 
government measures against personal lies was a more complicated one. 
Instead of finding that personal lies were maximally protected (except 
where they caused legally cognizable harm) or entirely unprotected 
(except where they were interwoven with political debate), the 
concurrence found such lies existed in a challenging First Amendment 
middle ground. In this middle ground, judges could not know if 
government restriction was permissible or impermissible under the First 
Amendment until they took a closer, context-sensitive look at the both the 
potential harms raised by the falsity in question and the First Amendment 
benefits that might be lost by letting government attack it.
102
 
In any case, government restriction of fake news is unlikely to 
occasion similar disagreement. The kinds of reports that typically get 
labelled as fake news tend to focus on the very subjects that all the 
Justices found to be strongly protected by the First Amendment: they tend 
to concern political life, historical events, or findings generated by 
science.  
One might wonder why the Justices in Alvarez should grant the same 
First Amendment protection to verifiably false statements concerning 
philosophy, history, science, or similar topics as is given to claims that are 
true, might be true, or are opinions (that thus cannot be classified as true or 
false). Consider a public debate about the wisdom of the continuing U.S. 
presence in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban and those they support in the 
Al Qaeda. It is probably clear to most Americans why the First Amendment 
staunchly protects a person’s right to call for withdrawing all American 
troops from Afghanistan or to state, more generally, that our presence in 
Afghanistan “accomplished nothing of value,” even if government officials 
and many members of the public believe such a statement is entirely wrong 
and that, for example, important counterterrorism objectives require a 
continued U.S. military presence there. But why, one might wonder, should 
First Amendment protection also extend to false factual claims that a person 
makes about American operations or what led to them? Why, for example, 
would the First Amendment protect a person in giving a false account of an 
alleged high-casualty American operation that never took place? Or in falsely 
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insisting that the terrorist attacks Al Qaeda conducted on September 11, 
2001, and commanded while being sheltered by the Taliban, actually had 
nothing to do with Al Qaeda and were ordered by the Bush administration 
itself?  
Other scholars have provided cogent explanations as to why such false 
statements of fact might receive First Amendment protection, some of which 
have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in past First Amendment cases.
103
 
In a careful and systematic analysis of this question, Helen Norton identifies 
three principal reasons that government measures taken to restrict lies, or 
possibly other false statements of fact, may violate the First Amendment. One 
is that some lies have value. Lies can protect privacy; they can “trigger 
confrontation and rebuttal” and by doing so “lead to increased public 
awareness and understanding of the truth.”104 In other cases, lies may be an 
essential part of strategies for uncovering the truth. Investigative journalists 
and police informants, for instance, might lie about their identities and 
motivations because wrongdoers would be unlikely reveal the harms they 
inflict on the public to people they knew to be serving the public interest. 
This is one of the reasons that Justice Breyer, in his Alvarez concurrence, 
finds that lies and other false statements sometimes receive First Amendment 
protection.
105
 
A second reason for First Amendment protection of false facts, notes 
Norton, is not that lies have intrinsic value but rather that, in a world where 
false speech could be subjected to harsh punishment, individuals may avoid 
even true or otherwise valuable speech out of fear that they it might include 
falsity.
106
 As the Supreme Court noted in New York Times v. Sullivan, not 
only might the fear of slipping into falsity chill other speech; the fear of being 
accused of falsity (and having to defend against it in court) even when one 
hasn’t said or written anything false may achieve the same end.107 Moreover, 
it is at times unclear whether a statement constitutes an opinion or idea or 
instead constitutes a fact. In Gertz, the Court stated “there is no such thing as 
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a false idea” (or opinion, for which it used idea as a synonym).108 But there 
can be, it said, a “false statement[] of fact.”109 One might thus propose a First 
Amendment regime that bars government from punishing opinions it 
identifies as unworthy but allows it to punish facts it can demonstrate to be 
false in a way that would presumably count as objective. It may not be clear, 
however, when a statement can be demonstrated to be false in this way.  
For example, the claim that “serious crime is rising in major American 
cities,” may be regarded as factually false if it is taken to mean—as many 
listeners would understand it—that the number of recorded murders and other 
violent crimes is higher this month or year than in previous time frames. In 
that case, one could presumably compare the statement to a trustworthy 
analysis of some trustworthy source of data. But the statement could also be 
understood as a vague claim about certain unspecified “serious” crimes 
becoming more of a problem in unspecified “American cities” (and “rising” 
could refer not to numbers but to increased effects, or fear of, crime). Other 
claims that make a statement, but leave out context, may mislead some 
audiences even though the speaker may assume that a critical listener should 
be aware that statements cannot always include context. The consequence of 
this blurriness in the boundary between a verifiably false fact and an 
unverifiable expression of one’s belief or perception about the world is that 
individuals may end up on the wrong side of this poorly marked line. And, as 
a consequence of crossing such a boundary, an individual might lose First 
Amendment protection for their speech, or at least create a situation where an 
opponent can bring a suit (or a prosecutor to bring charges) by presenting a 
claim as a false factual statement even where it may not actually be. A First 
Amendment guarantee against such legal trouble or punishment gives people 
freedom to engage in robust debate without worrying that they will be sued or 
penalized for it.  
Third and finally, Norton writes, the First Amendment may bar 
government from targeting lies in public discourse, not in order to protect the 
lying, but in order to stave off the detrimental consequences of letting 
government exercise coercive authority over the exchange of ideas.
110
 It was 
this last reason for protecting falsity that won the explicit support of all of the 
Justices in Alvarez. As Justice Kennedy emphasized, having a government 
truth commission to identify and punish such falsities would be reminiscent 
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of the Orwellian “Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”111 Justice Alito’s dissent 
likewise emphasized that, in debates about matters of public concern, “it is 
perilous to permit the state to be the arbiter of truth,” even where the 
arbitrating is limited to identifying flagrantly false statements about history, 
philosophy, or other topics.
112
 Inviting the government to exercise control 
over public debate is to invite it to wield coercive power in a realm where the 
public must be as free as possible to form its own opinions and consider all 
proposals (even those the vast majority of the public regards as preposterous), 
where individuals must be left free to shape their own ideas, and where 
society must be left free to forge its own collective preferences.  
Jonathan Varat similarly explains that government cannot be given 
anything close to a blank check to regulate false or misleading information 
because public discourse and private deliberations alike are full of such 
information.
113
 To give government free reign—or anything resembling it—
to restrict falsity would thus effectively give government free reign to restrict 
much of our communication. Giving government unlimited power to drain 
our conversations of deceptive content would give it power undermine “our 
rights to personal and political self-rule.”114  
In public debate or personal conversations about a person’s values or 
understanding of the world, the remedy for falsehood thus comes not 
from government, in these Justices’ view, but from the critical faculties of 
the discussion’s participants and other sources they can recruit to evaluate 
the veracity and quality of claims addressed to them. As Justice Kennedy 
declared in his Alvarez opinion, “[T]he remedy for speech that is false is 
speech that is true.”115 The First Amendment’s solution to the challenges 
raised by non-factual or controversial claims is also its solution for 
verifiably false claims. Just as the permissible First Amendment response 
to unreasoned speech is not government suppression but rather rational 
speech, so the permissible response to a “straight out lie” is not 
government restriction but rather “the simple truth.”116 Rather than having 
to recruit government coercion to defend against falsity, as individuals do 
in the commercial realm or in certain security contexts, they can engage 
in a kind of self-defense by using their own powers of thought and 
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expression. Justice Alito did not agree that this stance applied to 
Alvarez’s flagrant lie about his personal history.117 But with respect to 
matters of public concern, he seemed to take the same approach that 
Justice Kennedy took to the broader category of speech lacking legally 
cognizable harm: it is for the marketplace of ideas to identify and correct, 
not government intervention.
118
  
The question this raises is whether there are times that (1) such self-
defense will be insufficient to combat a falsehood in expression; (2) the 
First Amendment should permit government to offer speakers and 
listeners some type of aid in this effort, of a kind government is normally 
barred from providing in individuals’ efforts to identify falsehood and 
resist being convinced by it; or (3) both. These two questions might each 
receive separate answers. It might at first seem to follow that, if speakers 
and listeners are unable to identify and avoid being duped by false 
statements, then some form of government control is needed, and the 
First Amendment should allow room for it. But it also may not be true 
that the solution to ineffectual self-defense against falsehood is recruiting 
government defense. Even if fake news or false speech raises a genuine 
problem, government intervention may be an ineffective solution—or one 
that, even if it succeeds, would bring even worse distortion into public 
debate or personal reflection than the one it was designed to combat. As 
the Court itself emphasized in Gertz, even where we cannot trust the 
marketplace of ideas to separate truth and falsehood, there is good reason 
to distrust government with that task even more strongly.
119
 If we wish to 
carefully elaborate—and perhaps rethink—the common ground the 
Justices laid out in Alvarez as we confront modern techniques and 
technologies for spreading fake news, we thus have to offer separate 
analysis of (1) the ways in which such fake news or similar 
misinformation might be able to overwhelm our ability to analyze it and 
counter the deception it aims to generate; and (2) what role, if any, 
government might play in addressing this problem, and what alternatives 
exist to government restriction where the latter would be intolerable given 
our First Amendment commitments. In Part III, I briefly review how 
some scholars have suggested the First Amendment may allow regulation 
of fake news. 
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III. Is There Deceptive Harm Without Legally Cognizable Harm? 
Would the framework I have described above need reshaping, or 
elaboration, to provide government with power to counter fake news, fake 
video or audio, or other forms of false expression that have raised 
concerns among journalists, legal commentators, and other observers? 
There is reason to think so: even Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in 
Alvarez, the opinion most comfortable with utilizing government power 
to regulate false statements, did not wish to leave the government with 
power to restrict falsehoods that arise in robust debates about 
“philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and other 
matters of public concern.”120 When fake news sites report voter fraud or 
other crimes by public figures that never happened, peddle conspiracy 
theories about the American government orchestrating the September 11 
attacks, or claim the Sandy Hook killings were staged, the false 
information is not only flatly wrong, it is a flatly wrong claim about 
politics, history, crime, or war. There is little doubt that the questions they 
address are questions about matters of public concern—however insane 
and untenable their answers to these questions may be. Thus, they are not 
merely factually false statements, they are factually false statements that 
fall into a category of false statement that even Justice Alito assumed—
and that all of the Court’s Justices agreed—are virtually off limits to 
government restriction. 
Might the First Amendment nonetheless leave government with room 
to restrict or combat at least some of this falsehood? My main purpose in 
this Part is to explore some possible answers to this question. The most 
obvious possible avenue for justifying such regulation is to show that the 
two categories of lies I have thus far treated as mutually exclusive—lies 
that count as defamation or otherwise generate legally cognizable harms, 
and lies about matters of public concern, such as political life, history, 
and religion—can sometimes come packaged together in the same 
statement. A lie might be about public affairs while also defaming 
someone (such as a candidate it falsely describes as having committed a 
crime).  
In such a case, courts are likely to find that government may restrict or 
penalize the false statement in spite of its connection to matters of public 
concern in order to prevent the harm it causes. This, after all, is true of 
other circumstances where the government regulates political speech that 
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has a non-speech component, such as speech that threatens violence. A 
protestor who is passionately expressing anger against Wall Street might 
still be arrested if he expresses himself by blocking traffic at an 
intersection or throwing a brick through the window of a bank. Likewise, 
someone who incites website viewers to kill or injure doctors who 
perform abortions is still subject to punishment for incitement even if he 
can show his incitement is motivated by and expresses his strong protest 
against abortion.
121
 The First Amendment will not insulate traffic 
disruption, vandalism of property, or incitement to violence from 
government restriction just because such actions are interwoven with a 
political message.  
Similarly, imagine that a blogger maliciously—and falsely—states that 
a political figure is guilty of bribery. Further imagine that he does so 
because he wants that political figure, who has called for faster trials and 
harsher punishments, to understand what it is like to be falsely accused of 
a crime. The political dimension of the blogger’s false accusation won’t 
insulate him from liability for defamation. It will, to be sure, make it 
harder for a plaintiff to prevail. Under existing free speech doctrine, 
public figures can only prevail in a defamation case if they can show that 
the defendant had actual malice in making a false claim—that is, that the 
defendant knew the claim to be false or did so with reckless disregard of 
its falsity.
122
 But assuming the public figure can meet this hurdle, he can 
show the legally cognizable harm necessary to attack this falsehood free 
from heightened First Amendment scrutiny. Thus, where fake news is not 
merely fake, but is also harmful in a way that the law has viewed as the 
basis of a common law claim, the First Amendment allows it to be 
attacked by both the government and private litigants.  
One might argue that where lies or other falsehoods serve a particularly 
valuable First Amendment purpose, they should be shielded from 
government punishment or civil liability even when they would otherwise 
count as fraud. Justin Marceau and Alan Chen describe circumstances 
where investigative journalists have to lie to uncover information about 
lawbreaking or behavior that merits exposure and public 
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condemnation.
123
 Just as police informants might perpetuate fraud that 
would be illegal if they were not police informants, perhaps investigative 
journalists should similarly be shielded from liability that would 
otherwise apply when they lie in order to gain access to a facility that is 
trying to keep secrets from the public. In other words, there may be First 
Amendment benefits to information gathering that can succeed only with 
dissimulation; perhaps these benefits transform what would otherwise be 
low-value misrepresentation (amounting to fraud) into a crucial 
component of high value expression.  
This might also be true in other circumstances. David Han has argued 
that autobiographical lies are valuable instruments of self-definition. A 
person exercises autonomy in part by exercising control over how she 
presents herself to the world.
124
 On Han’s account, such autobiographical 
lies clearly merit constitutional protection when their intended effect is 
“purely psychological”—that is, where its aim is to shape others’ beliefs 
about the liar rather than to shape others’ actions in ways resulting in 
“material harm.” 125 It is at least conceivable, however, that, in some 
cases, a lie used as an essential part of such self-presentation—
particularly if made to counter a harsh representation of the person by 
others in a community—might merit free speech protection even where it 
fits the definition of fraud. Just as investigative journalists may need to 
engage in deception that is normally impermissible to play a crucial role 
in promoting self-government and raising public awareness of abuses of 
power, so individual autonomy may likewise require deception of a kind 
that is normally illegal or unethical. 
For example, imagine a person who revises pages in his diary and then 
refers to such a forgery in arranging a paid speaking engagement. It is 
likely that person should face liability for using false information to 
obtain payment he may not have obtained if he had been honest about his 
personal history. But, if Han is correct that the power to mold one’s 
biography, even with tall tales, is one variant of a power of self-definition 
central to First Amendment purposes, then a court might pause before 
imposing liability on use of such a power. It might use a framework like 
Justice Breyer’s balancing test in Alvarez to ask whether the harm done 
                                                                                                                 
 123. Chen & Marceau, supra note 103, at 1438. 
 124. David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection of Self-
Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 117–18 (2012). 
 125. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/5
2018]       LIES, LINE DRAWING & (DEEP) FAKE NEWS 89 
 
 
by a person’s creative forgery of his own past personal identity really 
justifies punishing it in spite of its First Amendment benefits.  
The major concern of this Essay, however, is not whether the 
misrepresentations that all of the Justices in Alvarez regard as low value 
might become high-value First Amendment activity in some 
circumstances, and thus merit the kind of strict or heightened scrutiny 
normally denied to them. It is rather the opposite inquiry: Are there times 
when falsehoods that appear to be on matters of public concern might be 
treated as akin to low-value speech and, thus, lose the strong First 
Amendment protection they normally receive, making them potential 
targets of government regulation? Might fake news or junk science fall 
outside of the First Amendment entirely despite the fact that it is 
presented and sometimes perceived as news or as science? Might a fake 
video depicting a police shooting or battlefield bombing that never 
occurred be denied First Amendment protection—even where there is no 
legal argument presented that it contains defamation, or constitutes 
incitement? If not, might it at least fall into a place with weaker First 
Amendment protection? 
One possible response to these questions is to criticize my assumption 
that all or most examples of fake news would necessarily count as a part 
of the categories of falsehoods about “philosophy, religion, history, the 
social sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern.” The 
boundaries of such bodies of knowledge are unclear. Still, if the relevant 
inquiry is whether the speech is on a “matter of public concern,” the 
Supreme Court has interpreted this category very broadly. In Snyder v. 
Phelps, a case that asked about the public-concern test in the context of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Supreme Court said that, 
although “the boundaries of the public concern test are not well-defined,” 
it generally encompasses speech that can “be fairly considered as relating 
to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,” or 
that “is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public.”126  
There is little question, then, that most fake news would fit this 
description if it weren’t fake. Consider false claims of voter fraud 
designed to nullify the votes of certain groups of voters. Where real voter 
fraud or voter suppression occurs, this is unquestionably a matter of 
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public concern. So although fake reports of voter fraud—such as those 
circulated by the Russian operated Twitter account “Tennessee 
GOP”127—are false, they are also about an issue of public concern.  
But perhaps, one might argue, certain discrete statements that 
individuals make in the course of making a statement of political import 
should not automatically be treated as speech on matters of public 
concern and, thus, insulated from government control. Imagine, for 
example, that rather than simply stating that he was a Medal of Honor 
winner and describing his battlefield heroics, Xavier Alvarez made this 
statement as a prelude to another statement that “having experienced the 
horrors of war,” he “knows better than most people why the United 
States’ missile attacks in the Middle East are reckless in risking another 
war.” In this circumstance, the statement made criminal by the Stolen 
Valor Act (that Alvarez is a Medal of Honor winner) is simply an 
autobiographical lie used to make a subsequent political claim more 
persuasive. It seems unlikely, however, that Justice Alito would thus 
classify it as a being a statement about a matter of public concern or as 
insulated from government restriction on the ground that state restriction 
of such claims would make it too easy for the “state to use its power for 
political ends.”128 And some of the falsity in fake news is similar: when 
Russian agents established the Twitter account “Tennessee GOP,” this 
falsely portrayed them as an American, Tennessee-based Republican 
party organization, but it did so as a prelude to their use of the Twitter 
handle to make political statements about the election. Others within the 
U.S. might similarly lie about their own pasts in order to frame the speech 
they then make about political matters. Thus, the position of the Alvarez 
dissent might allow the state to restrict at least this part of fake news and 
junk science. And Justice Breyer’s concurrence could similarly subject it 
to a balancing analysis of a sort that government might win. 
But this seems problematic, especially given that “boundaries of the 
public concern test are not well-defined.”129 Why should a verifiably false 
biographical claim made in political discourse or historical argument be 
any more vulnerable to government suppression than another verifiably 
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false claim made in such debates? Why, for example, is it any less 
troublesome to punish Alvarez’s lie about past military experience he 
never had than it would be to punish an intentionally false claim of his 
about battlefield events that never really occurred? There may be answers 
one can offer to such questions. But without clearer answers than those 
provided by the Alvarez dissent, such considerations provide reason to 
adhere to Justice Kennedy’s assumption that all false statements should 
be treated like falsehoods in public discourse unless they raise the kind of 
harms recognized to justify state intervention.  
It is worth considering two other varieties of arguments that even such 
falsehoods on matters of public concern should be subject to some 
government restrictions or liability in spite of the risks that arise when the 
First Amendment allows “the state to be the arbiter of truth.”130 Each 
variety comes with its own line-drawing challenges. First, some scholars 
have argued that where people lie to manipulate a listener, such 
manipulation through false speech should be excluded from First 
Amendment’s protection. Such manipulation, of course, might be 
accomplished through speech about politics, history, and science. It might 
also be accomplished by speech that is not necessarily defamatory and 
does not defraud anybody of anything of value in the way that is typically 
necessary for false speech to count as fraud under state law. Such 
manipulation through falsehood may occur, for example, where a fake 
news piece is designed to manipulate someone into supporting or 
denouncing a candidate on the basis of false information.  
The second argument concerns situations when a falsehood comes 
from an expert or other speaker with an exclusive claim to certain 
knowledge—one in whom listeners will predictably and justifiably place 
their trust even when the speaker conveys her knowledge in public 
discourse rather than in a fiduciary relationship. Freedom of speech, 
Robert Post has argued, covers communication that a listener can 
“autonomously query.”131 But certain kinds of expert knowledge don’t fit 
this description—certain knowledge is produced by experts whom the 
listener is poorly positioned to question. One might argue that even where 
such an asymmetry occurs in public discourse, there are situations where 
government might have at least limited power to assure it is not abused.  
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A. Manipulation Through Falsehoods 
One circumstance in which courts might allow government to restrict 
falsehoods—even when such falsehoods deal with political issues or 
other matters of public concern—is where doing so is necessary to 
prevent manipulative lying or manipulation through other false statements 
of fact. 
About twenty years before United States v. Alvarez was decided, David 
Strauss argued that the First Amendment should not protect a speaker’s 
use of lies to manipulate a listener such that the listener serves the 
speaker’s ends rather than her own.132 In fact, says Strauss, such 
manipulative lying not only lacks First Amendment value, it violates 
what he takes to be the core principle underlying First Amendment 
doctrine: the “persuasion principle.”133 The persuasion principle, as 
Strauss explains, stems from one of the most valuable functions of 
speech, and the one that the First Amendment is largely designed to 
protect—namely, the function speech performs when it “persuades,” 
inducing the listener to “action through a process that a rational person 
would value.”134 When a person gets a chance to hear and consider acting 
on ideas, even ideas the state views as dangerous, she is exercising her 
autonomy vis-à-vis her right to decide upon, and act according to, her 
own ends. But when the listener is deceived by false speech, she is doing 
something that autonomous and rational people never want to do: build 
their actions upon confidence in false factual premises. Moreover, where 
these false factual premises are fed to her by a speaker who uses them to 
steer her in ways she would never move herself, her autonomy is not only 
left unsupported, it is undermined, making the listener a tool of the 
speaker rather than an agent forming and acting on her own rational 
decisions. 
As a consequence, Strauss concludes that while the First Amendment’s 
support for an individual’s intellectual autonomy normally requires it to 
restrain the state from interfering in the processes by which individuals 
try to persuade each other, the same is not true when those proposals are 
manipulative lies.
135
 Far from enhancing autonomy, such “[l]ying is the 
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clearest case of the coercion-like, autonomy-invading manipulation that 
the persuasion principle is intended to prevent.”136 This is, thus, “a core 
area in which the harm of private manipulation seems great enough to 
justify government restrictions on speech.”137  
The consequence of such a framework depends heavily on what makes 
a lie count as manipulative. On one, fairly broad understanding of what 
constitutes manipulation, Strauss’s exclusion of manipulative lies from 
the First Amendment’s scope in some ways could provide a striking 
contrast with the positions taken by the Justices in United States v. 
Alvarez. This is true when manipulation might occur even where it leads 
merely to the adoption of certain beliefs or attitudes held by a listener, 
without some concrete action that the speaker desires the listener to take. 
It might also be true where the lying is designed to produce a specific 
action by the listener, but one without any legally cognizable harm.  
In either case, Strauss’s approach would be different than Justice 
Kennedy’s argument in the plurality opinion, where lies and other false 
statements of fact lose First Amendment protection only when they cause 
legally cognizable harm.
138
 After all, it is hard to argue that such legally 
cognizable harm results from all lies that are manipulative in the broad 
sense described above. If Alvarez tells a person that he has engaged in 
heroic activity on the battlefield, but does so in an attempt to win 
admiration rather than to defraud his listener of money, such a lie is 
manipulative because it aims to get the listener to react in ways he would 
not react but for the lie. But it is unlikely its manipulation would count as 
the kind of legally cognizable harm that would justify a lawsuit or 
criminal penalty.  
Manipulative lying of this kind would also likely be provided First 
Amendment protection by all the Justices in Alvarez where it not only 
lacks legally cognizable harm but also deals with issues of politics, 
history, philosophy, or other matters of public concern. This is the kind of 
manipulative lying that one might find in articles, tweets, or Facebook 
posts that spread fake news. Consider, for example, a tweet that makes a 
false claim about immigrant crime rates in order to motivate its readers to 
oppose legislative approval of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival 
Act (DACA). If the author of the tweet realizes the information she is 
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sharing is false and shares it anyway in order to generate political 
opposition to DACA, she is manipulating her readers with false 
information. So long as the claim does not defame particular individuals 
or organizations, however, this lie is likely to be the kind of lie that the 
Justices in Alvarez were unwilling to exclude from First Amendment 
coverage and to which they would have provided the same robust First 
Amendment protection that covers accurate claims about politics or 
political opinions. 
But Strauss’s approach is not inevitably in conflict with the Alvarez 
opinions. As noted above, how much room Strauss’s framework provides 
for government restriction of false statements on political matters, or 
other matters of public concern, would depend on how one defines what 
counts as manipulative. 
One important question is what exactly is denied First Amendment 
protection by a proposal denying it to “false statements of fact by private 
speakers.”139 It seems clear that Strauss means to exclude lying—a 
situation where the false statement of fact is known to be false by the 
speaker. The speaker “inject[s] her own false information into the thought 
processes of the listener for the purpose of making those processes 
produce the outcome that the speaker desires.”140 
But lying is not the only way a listener’s thought processes can become 
infected by false information. A listener can also receive false 
information from a speaker who genuinely believes that the false 
information is true. This kind of deception occurs, for example, when a 
conspiracy theorist spreads false information, such as a story that a school 
shooting was staged by the federal government to justify greater gun 
control, not in order to intentionally deceive someone but to convince the 
listener of something the speaker believes. On the one hand, the outcome 
is still in tension with the persuasion principle. A “rational person,” 
Strauss argues, “never wants to act on the basis of false information,” and 
by urging such a person to act on the basis of false information, the 
conspiracy theorist is urging someone to act irrationally even though the 
conspiracy theorist is subject to the same delusion.
141
 On the other hand, 
from the conspiracy’s theorist own vantage point, she is, unlike a liar, 
doing something the First Amendment staunchly protects: trying to 
                                                                                                                 
 139. Strauss, supra note 132, at 366. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 335. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/5
2018]       LIES, LINE DRAWING & (DEEP) FAKE NEWS 95 
 
 
convince someone else to adopt her own conclusions by presenting what 
she regards as valid evidence for such conclusions. And it seems quite 
likely that much of the fake news spread on Twitter is believed to be true 
by those who disseminate it. 
Second, one might question not only whether the manipulative use of 
falsehood loses First Amendment protection even when it is deception 
other than lying, but also what counts as manipulative for purposes of 
applying this principle.
142
 Consider, again, why lying is a perfect example 
of the “coercion-like, autonomy-invading manipulation that the 
persuasion principle is intended to prevent.”143 It is because a “speaker 
tells a lie in order to influence the listener’s behavior, . . . making it serve the 
speaker’s ends instead of the listener’s.”144 What kind of goals count as 
influencing behavior, or making someone serve the speaker’s ends? In cases 
where such manipulation might amount to fraud, it is because the victim of 
the fraud has been tricked into paying money or sacrificing something else of 
value. It seems likely that manipulation has also occurred where someone lies 
to a voter in order to get that voter to cast her vote for the opposing candidate. 
But in many false statements of fact online, the goal is vaguer. The false 
statement is not intended to generate a specific action, but rather to generate 
anger or disdain in the listener towards a certain political or social group. In 
other words, the false statement is not made in order to get them to take a 
specified action, but rather to encourage a general opposition to certain 
political views or leaders. Consider some of the information spread by the 
Russian Internet Research Agency, whose members have now been indicted 
by a grand jury for various violations of United States law.
145
 This group 
spread information on Twitter making false claims, for example, about voter 
fraud by Hillary Clinton.
146
 But their goal was not simply to motivate readers 
to vote against Clinton, but instead to “sow discord in the U.S. political 
system.”147 In some cases, liars may wish to spread information just because 
they want others to share their ideology, perhaps to advance it in practical 
                                                                                                                 
 142. This is a question that has also been discussed in other analyses of lying’s First 
Amendment status. See, e.g., Han, supra note 124, at 115–19 (exploring how one can draw a 
distinction between lies with “purely psychological effects” and thus that result in harm).  
 143. Strauss, supra note 132, at 366. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Indictment, supra note 28. 
 146. Id. at 19. 
 147. Id. at 4. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
96 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:59 
 
 
ways in some future day or perhaps, in the near term, simply to make the 
ideology less of a fringe belief. 
First Amendment principles provide good reason to err on the side of 
adopting narrower, more restrictive answers to the above questions. First, 
it is dangerous to give government significant power to punish, or subject 
to liability, those who spread falsehoods that they believe to be true. 
Again, if we passionately defend statements about politics that we believe 
to be true, we are engaging in—what from our perspective—is persuasive 
speech of the kind that lies at the core of the First Amendment. Where 
someone’s reputation is at stake, the law will sometimes make us liable for 
false statements we believe to be true. Individuals can sometimes be liable for 
defamation even when their reporting of false information is negligent or 
reckless rather than intentional lying. But applying the same standards of 
negligence or recklessness to general public statements would likely chill 
great swathes of public discourse. Second, if manipulation is defined broadly 
enough to include all effects a speaker desires to cause in a listener’s mind or 
disposition to take further unspecified action, then virtually all lying would 
become manipulative lying.  
Such considerations weigh in favor of defining “manipulative” quite 
narrowly. And Strauss seems to lean this way: in calling for the exclusion of 
false statements from the First Amendment’s scope, he adds the caveat that, 
although letting the government restrict “false statements of fact by private 
speakers . . . will do more good than harm,” doing so is likely to be safe for 
First Amendment freedom only if “the category of false statements of fact 
is . . . defined very narrowly.”148 
The upshot of this analysis is that Strauss’s arguments for excluding 
manipulative lying from the scope of First Amendment protection aren’t 
likely to leave much more speech unprotected than the Justices in Alvarez 
already did when they concluded that lying causing legally cognizable harm 
is outside the scope of the First Amendment. This is true because if 
manipulative lies are defined narrowly to cover only those lies where a 
speaker uses falsity to cause the listener to act in a specific way, many such 
lies will, in any event, count as fraud or some other already recognized 
legally cognizable harm.  
Such narrowness in defining manipulative lies is also important for 
another reason. Even when lying is manipulative in that it is aimed at making 
a listener embrace certain beliefs she would otherwise reject, and perhaps 
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then act in accord with those beliefs, some of the lies scholars and judges 
identify as valuable may have this character—at least, if the category of 
manipulative lies is defined too broadly. As David Han argues, 
autobiographical lying is often used by individuals to engage in self-
definition.
149
 While listeners may not want to be deceived by such lies from 
others, they might strongly prefer a world where such autobiographical lying 
is legal, and thus constitutionally protected, so they remain free to engage it 
themselves. Remaining vulnerable to such deception, in other words, may be 
a price they are willing to pay if that is the only way they can retain for 
themselves the continued freedom to present themselves in the way they wish 
to be seen. They may likewise want to live with the risk of being deceived by 
an investigative journalist if doing so is the price they have to pay for such 
journalists to expose dangers they and their fellow citizens need to know 
about.  
B. Expert Truths  
The premise I explored in the last subsection was that it is not at odds with 
the First Amendment for government to assume that all individuals have a 
duty to avoid manipulating others with false information. But it is also 
possible to conceive a narrower truth-telling duty, one that generally binds 
not all individuals, but only those who have expert or specialized knowledge 
or, for some other reason, have to be trusted by listeners. As Robert Post 
writes, much of our knowledge of the world comes not from direct 
perception, but rather from what we learn from scientific experts, historians, 
or other experts whose methods for producing that knowledge are quite 
different from the chaotic debates one finds in public discourse. As Post 
writes, “[E]xpert knowledge requires exactly what normal First Amendment 
doctrine prohibits.”150 Where normal public discourse requires that we decide 
for ourselves what opinions to embrace, without government or any other 
authority ordering us to favor one opinion over another, science, history, and 
journalism can produce content “we have reason to trust” only if the right 
kinds of experts can “distinguish meritorious from specious” claims.151 
It is not always the case, however, that affirmations by experts or others 
with privileged knowledge (such as an eyewitness) are required, by law, to be 
accurate. That depends on the context in which they occur. In certain 
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circumstances, experts have a legal duty to provide statements consistent with 
the standards of their discipline. This occurs, for example, when an expert is 
hired to provide medical or legal services. A doctor who has agreed to treat a 
patient has to answer that patient’s medical inquiry with an answer that 
constitutes competent practice of medicine. And a lawyer has to provide her 
client with competent legal advice. Similarly, expert witnesses at trial are 
bound to provide honest answers about their knowledge and may not be 
called upon to do so unless their expertise is genuine and is of the kind that 
will be helpful to the trier of fact in addressing particular questions.  
But in the realm of public discourse, even such experts are no longer 
bound to voice disciplinary wisdom. Whereas a doctor’s advice is supposed 
to accord with standards of her profession in her treatment of a patient, she is 
not similarly constrained when she writes a book or a newspaper column. In 
“speech to the general public,” writes Post, a doctor (or other expert) has free 
speech rights they do not have in the conversations they have with their 
patients.
152
 The doctor might even receive protection if she falsely claims, for 
example, that evidence shows vaccination increases the risk of autism when it 
does not. Of course, she may suffer the opprobrium of colleagues and others 
in the medical community if she makes false or misleading medical claims in 
public discourse. She may find it difficult to publish an article about 
vaccination in any journal highly regarded within the medical community. 
But, thanks to the First Amendment, she cannot suffer a penalty at the hands 
of the state or federal government.
153
 
How does this relate to fake news or junk science? It is useful to focus on 
the latter example first. One might argue that perhaps—even in public 
discourse, on matters of public concern—the government ought to be able to 
impose limits on when experts can invoke their reputation to promote, as 
confirmed facts, claims that are roundly rejected by everyone else in their 
field. This is a possibility Jane Bambauer has recently explored in her 
scholarship. Where an expert’s false statement is likely to be relied upon by a 
listener in ways that cause harm, she argues, the statement’s falsity should be 
fair game for government restriction even if it occurs in public discourse.
154
  
Rather than generating rules for “false statements of fact,” she instead 
considers how different First Amendment rules might apply to three 
categories of knowledge she calls “accepted knowledge,” “contested 
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knowledge,” and “anti-knowledge.”155 The first and third of these categories, 
respectively, are refinements of what many others call true and false 
knowledge. Accepted knowledge consists of knowledge that is “supported by 
enough observations and credible evidence to clear the high bar established 
by the relevant experts” and others who are able to apply whatever 
epistemological standards determine what observation and evidence are 
sufficient.
156
 Anti-knowledge includes “statements that are in direct conflict 
with the statements contained in accepted knowledge,” such as “sets of 
claims that have been proven, based on prevailing scientific standards, to be 
incorrect.”157 In between these two categories is contested knowledge, 
consisting of “claims that may have some evidence in support, and perhaps 
some evidence in conflict, but not enough of either sort to conclusively place 
the statement into the accepted knowledge or anti-knowledge buckets.”158  
While government can, of course, already restrict anti-knowledge where it 
comes in the form of bad medical advice given by a doctor to a patient, 
Bambauer argues that “government should also be permitted regulate anti-
knowledge within the public discourse so long as the claim is likely to cause 
the listeners to take action that puts themselves or others in serious risk of 
harm, and the speaker has a sufficiently culpable mental state.”159 This 
argument is focused on scientific knowledge in public discourse, and she 
illustrates it by questioning the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion in Winter v. G.P. 
Putnam & Sons that the publishers of a reference book called “The 
Encyclopedia of Mushrooms” could not be liable, under product liability law, 
for identifying dangerous mushrooms as safe to eat.
160
  
It is not clear how much application such an analysis might have to 
journalism, to claims about politics or history, or to areas of science where a 
person’s health, safety, or property are not at stake. Junk science and bad 
medicine can lead individuals to place themselves in danger (for example, by 
eating poisonous mushrooms they fail to realize are poisonous). Erroneous 
directions on a chart or map can likewise cause trouble by leading someone 
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into dangerous territory.
161
 But it seems less likely that equally concrete 
harms will flow from falsehoods about politics or history. Individuals may 
regret a vote they cast on the basis of inaccurate political information or a 
protest they attended to express outrage against an event that never occurred. 
But such regrets are similar to the abandoned spiritual or ideological 
commitments which, as I noted earlier, individuals can’t treat as harms 
sufficient to create legal liability for those who lured them into a religious or 
political movement. A journalist’s flawed reporting might conceivably cause 
more harm—if, for example, it includes inaccurate descriptions of dangerous 
events (such as an impending tornado). But the question that needs answering 
here is why the First Amendment should allow any greater restriction of such 
speech in public discourse than it already does when it permits people to sue 
for defamation or intentional infliction of emotional distress, or allows the 
state to punish incitement, true threats, commercial speech, and low-value 
speech. 
The same question could arise about another variant of this argument: it is 
also possible, one might claim, that First Amendment law could treat certain 
false claims even by non-experts as subject to duties to avoid harmful false 
statements about facts to which a speaker has exclusive access. A comparison 
with trial evidence may be helpful here. It is not only the expert witness who 
brings to such a trial knowledge to which he has special claim. Rather, it is 
also the lay witnesses who have directly perceived events or other aspects of 
the world that no one else might have seen or heard.
162
 Just as the expert 
witness must testify honestly regarding the subject of his expertise, the lay 
witness is under an obligation to testify honestly about his experiences. 
Public discourse, of course, is not subject to the same constraint. If I write a 
blog post about events I have seen or heard or describe them in response to 
inquiries by a reporter, I am not under the same obligation to tell the truth that 
I am when I am on the witness stand. One might argue, however, that where a 
lie about my personalized knowledge will predictably cause certain harms to 
individuals who rely upon this knowledge to make certain decisions, then 
such a lie should perhaps be more vulnerable to government restriction than a 
lie I tell about some other subject (which no one has any need to rely upon). 
But again, one may ask, why doesn’t existing free speech doctrine on low-
value categories of speech—or other speech outside the boundaries of the 
First Amendment—already provide all the guidance one needs for addressing 
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when dishonest reports of personalized knowledge may be punished or 
subjected to civil liability? Why not hold, as Justice Kennedy argued in 
Alvarez, that a false report of an event may be punished when one lies to a 
police officer or other government official; when one commits perjury, or 
defrauds or defames someone; or when one otherwise causes a harm the legal 
system has recognized as a basis for a lawsuit or prosecution instead of 
granting the state the potentially dangerous power to punish any falsehood 
that it can characterize as a source of harm? Answering such a question once 
again depends on discussing line drawing and describing more specifically 
how the line between speech where reliance interests are and aren’t present in 
public discourse would differ from the line drawn in Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion between lies that cause legally cognizable harm and those that do not. 
IV. Free Speech and the Future of Forgery 
When someone critically assesses an argument, like the one I am 
making in this Essay, they can do so without seeing the world as I see it 
or asking me to provide facts in my sole possession. Someone might read 
this piece, consider its claims and the reasons it offers them, and decide 
that the reasons don’t convince her. They might do the same with any of 
the opinions in United States v. Alvarez. One does not have to learn about 
previously unknown facts, or rely heavily on social science or other data, 
to come to the conclusion that they disagree with some of the reasoning 
of Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, or 
Justice Alito’s dissent. Of course, certain data may well be helpful in 
judging certain claims within such arguments. It might be good to have 
data, for example, on the psychological processes that occur as 
individuals try to evaluate arguments. But such data isn’t essential for a 
reader to make some judgments about the persuasiveness of any of these 
opinions, or a law review essay about them. This is thus one situation 
where individuals at least have the potential to act as their own watchmen 
for truth. In any event, this is not a role government can constitutionally 
wrest from individuals through use of its coercive power: we cannot trust 
government to mandate which arguments we should accept and which we 
should reject. And even though some questions require an authoritative 
answer from a court or legislature so that law and policy can take a 
certain form, that only means that we have to live under that decision, not 
that we have to agree with it or consider it correct. 
A person is typically less self-reliant, however, when assessing a 
factual claim about the external world. There aren’t many such claims I 
am in a position to test against my own personal experience. Rather, I rely 
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on a complex array of social practices and practical realities to help me 
expand my factual knowledge beyond the very narrow sample of reality I 
can perceive by myself. For example, if I wanted to know, while in 
Oklahoma, the weather conditions in New York City, I would have to call 
a friend there and ask them, watch a weather report on TV that provides 
that information, or check a weather-oriented website or smartphone app. 
Similarly, almost the entirety of my knowledge of the facts central to the 
nation’s political life comes second- or third-hand as well; indeed, I don’t 
interact with the key players in Congress or the Executive Department 
regularly and have met only a few of them. Thus, my knowledge of what 
President Trump or members of the Senate or House of Representatives 
are doing each week has to come from other reports whose veracity I can 
trust—this time not from distant friends, but from the journalists who, as 
the Supreme Court once said, “act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the public.”163  
At times, the inaccessibility of a factual claim results not only from the 
great distance or other barriers between me and the fact or event I can’t 
directly observe, but also because it is the kind of fact the world conceals 
from our senses entirely until experts use scientific experimentation and 
analysis to extract it. We only know about the role DNA plays in cell 
function and reproduction or about the properties of electrons, for 
example, because scientists have been able to learn such information from 
a systematic study of the world.
164
  
The inaccessibility of facts to any one individual raises another 
potential challenge for the First Amendment model that the Supreme 
Court developed during the mid-to-late twentieth century and that served 
as crucial background for United States v. Alvarez. That is, we can act as 
our own watchmen for truth, when it comes to factual claims, but not 
because we are capable of perceiving most of the factual realm directly. 
We clearly aren’t. Rather, we play this role only because we can rely on 
and trust in a complex set of social institutions and practical technologies 
to reveal aspects of the world to us. Americans and members of certain 
other Western societies can learn about and monitor their countries’ 
political life only because they can rely, to some extent, on journalists, 
historians, and, at times, fellow citizens to share and aggregate 
information about such events. We can understand the hidden 
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characteristics of the world that scientists uncover only if the scientific 
community accurately and honestly uses its disciplinary study to uncover 
this realm and vet the work of other scientists to assure it is reliable.  
In a sense, these social practices extend our perception. Video and 
audio technology are perhaps the most obvious examples of such 
extended perception: they allow us to see and hear events that we cannot 
witness personally. But we also rely on other individuals’ perception—
like that of journalists or the individuals interview by journalists—and 
treat it as a basis for knowledge about the world. 
One starting point for elaborating and perhaps revising the consensus 
understandings in United States v. Alvarez
165
 is to make it clear that the 
First Amendment should, if possible, leave the government with room to 
protect us not only from false speech that causes us material harm but 
also from falsity that inserts itself into, or convincingly disguises itself as, 
at least some of the channels of indirect knowledge that we crucially rely 
upon to deliver perceptional experiences beyond those which we can 
create for ourselves.
166
 
And modern technology has, in some ways, made us far more 
vulnerable to such attacks on the knowledge ecosystem for this purpose. 
As noted earlier, the rise of computer technology has made certain kinds 
of forgeries and imitations easier. This is, in part, perhaps because we 
have altered some of the aspects of the knowledge ecosystem in ways that 
make it easier to fake. For example, we increasingly communicate by 
email or text messaging in circumstances where we would have 
previously used a phone call. Where we once might have had a good 
basis to know it was really our employer, colleague, or friend contacting 
us on the phone with new, important information about significant 
developments in the world, we may now find that we too quickly accept 
as real an email purporting to be from that employer, colleague, or friend 
but that really is from someone who is imitating them to manipulate us. 
Thus, cybersecurity specialists now face the challenge of helping people 
avoid falling for “spear-phishing” emails, wherein attackers “disguise 
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themselves as a trustworthy friend or entity to acquire sensitive 
information,” using information about the intended victim such as “their 
friends, hometown, employer, locations they frequent, and what they 
have recently bought online.”167 Some such attacks also disguise 
themselves as internal company emails, using information gathered from 
surveillance of companies. 
Our increasing reliance on internet-based communication may likewise 
make us vulnerable not only to fake personal communications but also to 
fake news. Now that newspapers are on websites, the code or design of 
which can be easily copied by digital means, creating fake versions of 
established newspapers is far simpler than it was when newspaper 
production relied on possessing and using a powerful printing press. And 
fake newspaper creators who are unwilling to risk subjecting themselves 
to trademark infringement suit from the New York Times, the Miami 
Herald, Time Magazine, or another publication might instead create an 
entirely fake publication with the appearance and feel of a real newspaper 
or magazine. The creator of the Christian Times Newspaper, the fake 
publication that ran a made-up story about election fraud, attempted to do 
this. Legitimate news sites themselves have arguably contributed to this 
problem. When a news network’s home page includes links not only to 
the journalism it produces itself but also to commercially sponsored 
“stories” that nonetheless have an appearance very similar to those of the 
news network, this risks confusing readers about what content is 
produced according to the normal practices of journalists and what is 
offered by commercial entities who are doing so with an eye to encourage 
particular types of consumer behavior.  
As noted before, developments in audio- and video-editing technology 
raise an even more significant threat. Almost twenty years ago, in 1998, 
science fiction writer and technologist David Brin warned, “One of the 
scariest predictions now circulating is that we are about to leave the era of 
photographic proof. . . . We are fast reaching the point where expertly 
controlled computers can adjust an image, pixel by microscopic pixel, 
and not leave a clue behind.”168 Now, many articles are reporting such a 
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similar technological transformation is occurring not just in the realm of 
still pictures but also in the realm of audio-visual recording. National 
Public Radio (NPR), The Verge, and other media outlets, for example, 
recently ran stories on a Canadian company called Lyrebird that, 
according to NPR, has “come up with a way to recreate anyone’s voice 
and get it to say almost anything.”169 It uses computer algorithms to 
capture the distinctive features of someone’s voice from a voice sample 
as short as a minute in length. Programs can then produce a voice eerily 
similar to that of Donald Trump, Barack Obama, or any other voice they 
analyze and instruct it to say whatever content is fed to it. The voices 
produced are still noticeably artificial, but this technology will only 
improve.
170
 And, as The Verge reports, Lyrebird’s audio simulation 
technology can reportedly “infuse the speech it creates with emotion, 
letting [users of the software] make voices” that they simulate “sound 
angry, sympathetic, or stressed out.”171 Further, Lyrebird is not the only 
company creating such technology. Google has also produced technology 
for simulating distinctive voices, and Adobe’s Project VoCo “can edit 
human speech like Photoshop tweaks digital images.”172 
Other researchers at the University of Washington and Stanford have 
generated tools for manipulating video of speakers. Using this 
technology, a video of Donald Trump or Barack Obama can be altered so 
that it shows their lips forming words they never said, to go with the 
fabricated audio of words they never voiced.
173
 As The Guardian notes, 
this “new breed of video and audio manipulation tools, made possible by 
advances in artificial intelligence and computer graphics, . . . will allow 
for the creation of realistic looking footage of public figures appearing to 
say [] anything.”174 The article describes this as “the future of fake news” 
and noted it means we will have to question not only “everything we 
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read, but soon we’ll have to question everything we see and hear as 
well.”175 As with audio simulation, the video simulation is not quite yet 
good enough to fool a careful observer.
176
 
One widely discussed version of this fabricated reality is the deep fake, a 
video scene that, as discussed above, shows someone doing something they 
didn’t actually do, thanks to sophisticated computer technology that imposes 
their face on the body of the person actually in the video footage. The 
computer technology involves a kind of artificial intelligence called “deep 
learning” (hence the name “deep fake”).177 To date, the technology’s most 
noticed use has been to create pornography films featuring celebrities who 
neither appeared in them nor consented to have their image use for such 
purposes.  
But like other forms of fake video and audio, deep fakes can be used for 
other malicious purposes. As discussed in the introduction, a recent 
Lawfare blog post uses the term deep fake to describe alteration of an 
image, video, or audio source to make it appear that someone did 
something that they did not actually do—and with such technological 
sophistication that the “unaided observer cannot detect the fake.”178 Such 
fabrication of reality, the blog post notes, can create havoc for the way 
individuals understand the world and thus unbalance their foundation for 
action.
179
 Moreover, such fabrications might not only gull individuals into 
taking actions with negative personal consequences, but also may lead to 
harms that tear “the very fabric of democracy”—for example, by generating 
fake evidence of race-based violence or of war crimes.
180
 Interestingly, the 
authors stress the threat raised by deep fakes by revising the same metaphor 
that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes used to explain, in 1919, why First 
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Amendment speech rights must have limits. Holmes “warned a century ago 
of the danger of shouting fire in a crowded theater”; with the use of deep 
fakes, “now those false cries might go viral, fueled by the persuasive power 
of hyper-realistic evidence in conjunction with the distribution powers of 
social media.”181 
As many writers have noted, more primitive equivalents of such tools 
are already being used by those who wish to commit fraud. Already, 
many criminals are trying to use fake identities to commit computer 
crime or other crime that requires deception.
182
 As the fact-checking 
website Snopes.com describes the scheme, “a scam artist gleans just 
enough information about a family (e.g., names, ages, addresses, phone 
numbers) to be able to impersonate one of them during a brief phone call 
to another family member.”183 The scam artist then calls a member of the 
family—usually a grandparent—claiming to be the grandchild and facing 
significant distress and in need of money.
184
 Such scams have worked 
even without the technology I have described above. Such a scam could, 
of course, be far more convincing if the impersonator could not only use 
the grandchild’s name and other information, but also a carbon copy of 
her voice. This technology also gives criminals methods of creating even 
more damaging versions of the spear-phishing emails described above. 
Instead of an email from your employer asking you to provide certain 
sensitive information to a certain email address or wire money to a bank 
account, you might receive a phone call in which such an instruction 
comes from a simulation of your employer’s voice. 
There are, to be sure, already laws that allow government to 
aggressively pursue and seek punishment for criminals who use such 
methods. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act already criminalizes using 
some of these methods to gain unauthorized access to computer 
information (or access that exceeds what is authorized).
185
 Identity theft 
and wire fraud laws might also apply. Many states have laws defining and 
imposing punishment on “criminal impersonation” or “false 
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personation.”186 Oklahoma’s statutes, for example, make it a crime to 
“falsely personate another” and perform certain actions in that “assumed 
character.”187 One violates this law, when, while impersonating another 
person, one “[s]ubscribes, verifies, publishes, acknowledges or proves, in 
the name of another person, any written instrument, with intent that the 
same may be delivered or used as true.”188 One likewise violates the law 
when one performs actions that would, if done by the victim of the 
impersonation, make the latter “liable to any suit or prosecution, or to pay 
any sum of money, or to incur any charge, forfeiture or penalty” or that 
brings “any benefit . . . to the party personating, or to any other 
person.”189  
It is unlikely any of these legal restrictions on impersonation or misuse 
of others’ identity would face First Amendment difficulties. As noted 
above, even the opinion in Alvarez that extended the strongest free speech 
protection to false statements of fact, that of Justice Kennedy, emphasized 
that “[w]here false claims are made to effect a fraud or secure moneys or 
other valuable considerations, say offers of employment, it is well 
established that the Government may restrict speech without affronting 
the First Amendment.”190 The crime of false personation seems to fit 
squarely within this category of entirely unprotected lying. So too do all 
of the spear-phishing attacks I have described, as well as the analogues of 
such attacks that might be carried out with fabricated video- or audio-
recordings. 
 The more difficult question is whether, and when, the law may also 
criminalize, or subject to civil liability, the use of such techniques to 
create fake news, to disguise content as expert knowledge when it is not, 
or to otherwise inject false content into public discourse. Should 
government have greater power to prevent such manipulation of 
communicative media or sources than it has, under the Alvarez 
framework, to punish false statements? 
The proposal I wish to briefly consider here is that judges and scholars 
should be open to answering yes—at least in some circumstances. Even if 
the Justices were right to assume in Alvarez that the false content of a 
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statement about politics, history, or other matters of public concern 
should not by itself normally suffice to eliminate First Amendment 
protection, the rule might different for methods that distort the medium 
that carries it. This is because, at least right now, we do not have the same 
repertoire of tools for dealing with falsified mediums or sources that we 
have for uncovering false claims. When confronted by a false statement 
from an individual or organization on Twitter or in a Facebook post, we 
can conceivably respond with skepticism—and then withhold acceptance 
of the claim until we see it confirmed by some more reliable source, such 
as multiple reports from professional journalists or video footage showing 
that the event described on Twitter or Facebook. By contrast, if this 
reliable journalistic or video check is itself rendered unreliable by 
widespread and easy-to-implement falsification methods, and particularly 
methods which (to quote Lawfare once again) make it impossible for an 
“unaided observer” to “detect the fake,” it is hard to see what basis of 
knowledge we will have to fall back on. 
There is, of course, a counterargument: we can learn to bring the same 
skepticism to audio and video evidence that many people already show to 
verbal reports. Indeed, as some who make this counterargument point out, 
such increased skepticism has already arisen for photos. In response to 
concerns about malicious uses of Lyrebird’s technology, for instance, one 
representative of Lyrebird stated that just as people “are now aware that 
photos can be faked,” they will, in the future, regard “audio recording” as 
“less and less reliable.”191 If an unaided observer cannot detect that a deep 
fake video is fake, she might perhaps withhold judgment about its 
accuracy until she can obtain the aid needed to meet that challenge—such 
as the aid of an expert in forensic video analysis, or in fact-checking 
suspicious visual evidence. 
Such a response, however, at the very least requires elaboration. It is 
true, of course, that in earlier times, when we lacked any technology for 
creating video and audio evidence, we had to find some way to form 
beliefs about faraway events without it. But it is not clear how well 
modern life can function in a situation where photographic evidence, 
audio-recording, and video-recording can be used not only to fabricate 
reality, but also to fabricate the other sources of indirect knowledge that 
we might use to test it against. If the absence of video and audio evidence 
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leaves us to rely only on verbal reports, the problem is that these verbal 
reports can already very easily be designed to endorse false facts. 
Such an environment could leave us not with a free market of ideas, 
but rather, as noted in the introduction, in a kind of Hobbesian 
informational “war of all against all”192 where any and every source of 
factual information might be a fake. This brings us at least a little bit 
closer to the kind of nightmarish dystopia described in this Essay’s 
introduction: the kind common in the genre of paranoid science fiction, 
where all of our perceptual experience might be a delusion.
193
  
To be sure, a world of forged photos, videos, and newspapers is not 
quite as unsettling as a world where human beings are themselves fake, or 
where the objects they see can and see and touch are illusions. But the 
informational anarchy and paranoia that could characterize such a world 
might at least present a serious (and possibly insuperable challenge) to 
those elements of individual decision making or collective self-rule that 
require us to trust some sources of external information.
194
 
Consequently, scholars and jurists should at least explore adding the 
following addendum to the framework from United States v. Alvarez: 
where false statements do not merely state false facts, but are also given 
in a form that carries with it indicia for reliability (such as a falsified 
newspaper or video or audio tape), the government should have greater 
power to regulate than it typically has to regulate false words. It should 
not, under this approach, always have to demonstrate that additional harm 
flows from the forgery of a video or faked news story from a major 
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publication. The trick such an alteration plays on our senses and our 
ability to serve as watchmen should, in some cases, by itself be enough to 
act against the forgery.  
This is already how the First Amendment applies where individuals 
imitate government officials—for example, in impersonating a police 
officer. Justice Kennedy acknowledged in Alvarez that laws may 
“prohibit impersonating a Government officer” and punish someone who 
engages in such impersonation even without a showing of “‘actual 
financial or property loss’ resulting from the deception.”195 He argues that 
the First Amendment can allow such punishment of falsity in the absence 
of a showing of financial or other concrete harm because such 
impersonation threatens another kind of harm: undermining the dignity 
and good repute of government. But fabrication of video- or audio-
recordings and of other social practices that allow us to identify reliable 
records of outside events can likewise do harm even where it does not 
cause financial or physical harm. It can undermine our ability to generate, 
and then draw upon, reliable sources of knowledge of the world beyond 
our direct perceptions. 
This approach is necessarily tentative and comes with three major 
caveats. First, if it is to be an addendum to the Alvarez consensus among 
the Justices rather than a rejection of it, it cannot empower government to 
restrict the content of our communications in public discourse. Consistent 
with that consensus, individuals should still be able make whatever 
claims—even false ones—they wish to make about matters of public 
concern so long as they avoid doing so in ways that defame, defraud, or 
otherwise cause legally cognizable harm to others. What they should not 
have free rein to do under the cover of the First Amendment, under the 
approach considered here, is disguise the source of their claims in 
authoritative clothing by using technology such as video- or audio-
fabrication or digital forgery to give it an appearance of reality that the 
expressive content alone cannot create. In other words, while the First 
Amendment gives someone the right in a discussion of public affairs to 
provide any answer they like—even a false one—to the question, “What 
should I believe?” and even to the follow-up question, “Why should I 
believe that?,” it doesn’t give them the right to answer the latter question 
by creating an illusion rather than an explanation.  
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This means that courts must somehow be able to mark a line between 
the expressive content itself and the features of that content’s medium or 
source—and to assure that the expressive content remains free from 
government censorship in the absence of legally cognizable harm. But 
drawing such a line may be quite challenging. The analysis above has 
been built in part on the intuition that there is an important distinction in 
the way we perceive different kinds of evidence about events in the 
external world and, more specifically, that we tend to view video or audio 
footage as a form of indirectly perceiving an event for ourselves. What 
we see or hear in a recording is often treated by people not as a form of 
evidence that may be subject to distortion or manipulation, but as a 
window into reality. By contrast, we are more likely to view verbal 
reports as possibly mistaken or dishonest. But one might object to giving 
this intuitive difference constitutional significance. After all, in response 
to the question “why should I believe” a certain proposition, one might 
answer with verbal explanation rather than pointing to a purported video 
or audio recording. If, for instance, someone is asked to prove that a riot 
occurred in a certain city, he might respond not by showing video or 
audio of the riot, but rather by answering that he was there and providing 
a description of the experience that seems rich in detail. The proposal I 
am making here—that courts might bar individuals from creating their 
own indicia of reliability (by, for example, creating video evidence)—
requires accepting First Amendment doctrine that allows restriction of 
one method of making the case for a belief (through altered video) but not 
another (by a verbal performance intended to give the false impression 
that certain memories and experiences actually occurred).  
Drawing a line between source or medium and content is likely to be 
even more difficult where one turns from recording to other indicia of 
reliability. How, for example, should the First Amendment treat a fake, 
web-based newspaper that adopts the look and feel of a real newspaper 
but does so without using any real newspaper’s trademark or trade dress? 
On the one hand, a website’s or print publication’s use of certain designs 
or names can effectively manipulate readers into assuming that the 
information is from a professional news organization that follows 
journalistic techniques for gathering and verifying information. On the 
other hand, the fake newspaper’s design choices intuitively seem to be as 
much a part of that newspaper’s expressive content as are the words or 
artistry on a book cover. Moreover, real journalists could conceivably 
find other, more foolproof ways of authenticating themselves to readers—
for example, with professional certification standards. And this 
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authentication method, then, may be something that the government 
might prevent someone from forging.  
Helen Norton has already analyzed a very similar challenge, exploring 
how the government can protect citizens from the confusion they might 
face “when private speakers seek the government’s perceived imprimatur 
to manipulate onlookers’ common—indeed, sometimes automatic—
reliance on an idea’s source as the measure of its value.”196 Her focus is 
on taking such concern into account and looking at a speech’s “source 
cues” to determine whether speech is private or government speech for 
purposes of the First Amendment.
197
 But it also stresses the importance—
to listeners and viewers—of being able to accurately identify speech that 
legitimately comes from government.
198
  
My major point in this subsection is a related one: our experience of 
the world—and our capacity to make confident judgments about it—
requires that we have some sources of evidence that, as Norton puts it, 
allow us to place “common” and perhaps “automatic” “reliance on an 
idea’s source as the measure of its value.”199 Moreover, where we do treat 
evidence that way, then First Amendment ground rules cannot insist that 
we be our own “watchmen for truth,” with all the uncertainty that entails: 
courts cannot demand that each of us show the kind of skeptical attitude 
and hesitation to accept a claim that is the hallmark of being a watchman 
with regard to evidence that we must be able to accept automatically and 
without anxiety about its truth. Courts already generally read the First 
Amendment as allowing government to help safeguard individuals’ 
reliance in certain contexts such as commercial or professional 
interactions. It may have some room to do so even outside of those social 
spheres where individuals need to take certain evidence on faith. 
A second caveat is that even if courts can meet the difficult challenge 
of drawing a line between falsification of a speech source or medium and 
false speech content, they could not simply assume that the First 
Amendment offers no protection on the non-content side of this line. The 
video-altering technology that allows individuals to undermine each 
other’s grasp of what is real will likely have other, more benevolent uses. 
It might, for example, provide moviemakers with yet another tool to 
                                                                                                                 
 196. Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech: Identifying the Expression’s 
Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 597 (2008). 
 197. Id at 597–618. 
 198. Id. at 615. 
 199. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
114 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:59 
 
 
create the special effects that can make narrative films feel real to an 
audience. Thus, the same technology that might lose First Amendment 
protection when it fabricates news might merit robust First Amendment 
protection when it is, like other tools of modern filmmaking, a means of 
telling a story. We thus appear to face, in addressing this technology, 
some of the same concerns that have pushed scholars like David Strauss 
to define the category of unprotected false statements “very narrowly.”200 
Giving the government too much power to control how we use image-
altering technology risks empowering it not only to prevent thorough 
deception, but also to restrict how we tell stories or otherwise express 
ourselves with technology. 
A third caveat is that the proposal considered here is far from a 
complete antidote for all of the dangers that flow from what Eugene 
Volokh calls “cheap speech.”201 In a 1995 article outlining the effects that 
the then-nascent internet might have on First Amendment activity, 
Volokh noted that while the internet would democratize speech and have 
other positive effects, “when speakers can communicate to the public 
directly, it’s possible their speech will be less trustworthy: they might not 
be willing to hire fact checkers, or might not be influenced enough by 
professional journalistic norms, or might not care enough about their 
long-term reputation for accuracy.”202 More recently, Tim Wu has linked 
the rise of cheap speech to the listeners’ ability to sort quality speech 
from falsehoods, thus also giving rise to forms of private censorship by 
speakers themselves. Wu emphasizes that whereas “it was once hard to 
speak, it is now hard to be heard,” because the flood of information 
available on the internet makes it hard to capture listeners’ attention.203 
Richard Hasen similarly argues that the internet-driven shift to cheap 
speech has caused a “collapse of traditional media” and “a rise in false 
news stories (‘fake news’) spread via social media.”204 Even if 
government can preserve the indicia of reliability of certain speech, that is 
no guarantee that listeners will notice the speech or do what they have to 
                                                                                                                 
 200. Strauss, supra note 132, at 366. 
 201. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1807 
(1995). 
 202. Id. at 1838. 
 203. Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 7 (Columbia Pub. Law Research, Paper 
No. 14-573, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096337. 
 204. Richard L. Hasen, Cheap Speech and What It Has Done (to American Democracy), 
18 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 200, 204–05 (2018).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/5
2018]       LIES, LINE DRAWING & (DEEP) FAKE NEWS 115 
 
 
do to locate it. Nor can any law assure that they will continue to use such 
indicia of reliability. Even if the First Amendment gives government 
leeway to stop individuals from exploiting and ultimately undermining 
the trust individuals place in certain media or sources of speech, it cannot 
force individuals to place more trust in professional journalists than in the 
wild speculations of conspiracy theorists. 
V. Conclusion 
The proposal I have just explored is that, by giving government more 
leeway to protect the marks of reliability in certain speech, the First 
Amendment can allow government to aid in preserving the value of social 
practices, like the practice of journalism or of scientific disciplines, that 
are themselves independent of government. What the government should 
be allowed by the First Amendment to do on this approach, in other 
words, is not take a leading role in sorting truth from falsehood. That is 
precisely what Supreme Court has said the Constitution cannot trust 
government to do. Rather, instead of replacing such social practices with 
its own truth-sorting mechanism, government’s role should be to preserve 
those social practices and technological possibilities that have already 
evolved and function free of government direction or interference. As I 
described above, such sorting is already done, though less dangerously, 
by certain social practices that individuals inevitably rely upon to form 
reliable knowledge about the world that lies beyond their direct 
perception—that is, it is already done by a knowledge ecosystem. If, even 
with the help of government defense against attacks of the sort made by 
digital impostors and forgery artists, this constellation of social practices 
and technology still finds itself collapsing, the solution will lie not in First 
Amendment law (or constitutional law of any sort), but in other measures 
that might entail the emergence of new social practices and technologies.  
At a high level of generality, what the First Amendment may have to 
allow room for is similar to the role played by the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) in the realm of copyright law.
205
 Congress did 
not invent the copyright protection technologies that various rights-
holders have generated to protect movies, for example, against the 
enhanced threat the computers have created to copyright (given the ease 
with which one can copy and disseminate a digital movie). What it did 
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instead is let private parties create such technology themselves, and then 
legally shield the technology from those who would circumvent it.
206
 
Although commentators have understandably objected to the high, often 
insuperable, barriers placed by the DMCA in the way of individuals who 
wish to make legal and “fair use” of movies or music,207 the general 
template is a common one and one that might have application in First 
Amendment law: when law establishes and protect rights, it does so in 
conjunction with other practices that make such rights possible, such as 
social norms or physical constraints. In fact, legal protection of rights is 
often most effective when it adds its protection to freedom-supporting 
features of the natural or social world or to technologies invented by 
private parties. Here, too, this may be a model that post-Alvarez First 
Amendment doctrine on false statements should allow room for. 
Conceding that it is not for law alone to save people from being deceived 
by fake news, judges might at least interpret the First Amendment to let 
government support the social practices and practical realities that do so 
(or may evolve to do so in the future). 
On the other hand, such a project also carries with it the same kinds of 
risks that have led the Court to hesitate before excluding false statements 
from the First Amendment’s scope. Just as allowing government to 
censor damaging lies might simultaneously empower it to exercise a more 
far-reaching power over public discourse, allowing it to restrict the way 
individuals use video-altering or other source-imitating technology may 
give it more power than it should have to control the way individuals 
express themselves (artistically or otherwise) with emerging technologies. 
The question raised by deep fakes and similar technology, then, is 
whether First Amendment law can leave government with room to 
protect the social foundations that allow individuals to serve as their own 
“watchmen for truth” without simultaneously inviting officials to control 
and restrict how they play that role.  
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